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ABSTRACT 
Practitioners, real estate professionals, and lay people throughout the 
country rely on the recording system to provide critical information 
regarding ownership rights and claims.  Indeed, the recording system acts as 
a virtually mandatory repository and disseminator of all potential parties’ 
claims.  This system, in turn, relies on these claimants and their agents to 
publicize their claims:  property purchasers, lenders, lien-claimants, title 
companies, attorneysthese parties interact, make deals, make claims, 
order their affairs, and then record.  The information system available to us, 
then, is only as good as what we make of it and what we put into it.     
As such, it is surprising how little thought has been put into exactly 
what it is that we record.  Should the mortgage of a lender in Ohio look like 
that of a lender in Florida?  Should a deed from an individual in Texas differ 
from that of a corporation in Nevada?  As it stands now, no one familiar 
with real estate law or commerce would expect different parties in different 
jurisdictions to record identical, or even similar, instruments.  In an 
immediate sense, this heterogeneity of the recorded documents (“vesting 
heterogeneity”) does not seem a good thing: parties utilizing the recording 
system generally seek to make known, or to discern, the same generic type 
of informationthat is, evidence of claims upon propertyso why are 
different forms and types of documents utilized all over the country?   
This Article analyzes this vesting heterogeneity from a new perspective 
and concludes that it is, in fact, cause for significant concern.  Vesting 
heterogeneity has arisen organically, growing with the recording system as 
they both evolved over time.  This historical explanation does not, however, 
excuse the cost associated with such a lack of uniformity.  Anyone seeking 
information with respect to any piece of property must navigate the 
complexities and uncertainties that arise because all such information is 
heterogeneous and, as a consequence, difficult to understand and utilize.  
This represents both an immediate transactional cost and an increased risk 
of ill-informed behavior.   
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This is particularly troublesome because this sort of cost-based concern 
arising from variability has a well-established analogue in property law that 
the law clearly desires to avoid.  That analogue is the cost that would arise if 
property law were to permit unlimited property forms and gives rise to what 
is known as the numerus clausus theory.  This theory explains the law’s 
hostility toward new, or different, types of property and holds that such 
heterogeneity is not generally permitted because of the extremely high 
informational costs associated with such creativity.   
This Article suggests that this common law concept can, and should, 
inform our analysis of vesting heterogeneity and that it precipitates strongly 
against such lack of uniformity.  This is because the costs that drive the 
numerus clausus to hold that variability should be limited are strikingly 
similar to those created by variability of vesting documents.  As such, this 
theory is relevant here such that the same analysis should be applied to 
vesting heterogeneity by asking whether a different (or “new”) document is 
helpful enough to outweigh the informational costs inherent therein.   
Based on this reasoning, this Article concludes that the law is wrong to 
systematically ignore heterogeneity in vesting documents.  Instead, a 
numerus clausus type of analysis should be applied to new or different 
vesting documents to determine whether any inherent lack of uniformity is 
defensible.  Where it is not, uniformity should be imposed. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
You are an associate at a mid-sized law firm in Ohio.  One day, a senior 
partner comes to you with a thin file, consisting only of a survey and a 
preliminary title report.
1
  She drops it on your desk.   
“My client wants to buy an old building in downtown Reno from a 
corporation called Blackacre, Inc.  He’s got to move fast, or he’ll miss his 
chance.  Take a look at the file and let me know by the end of the day if the 
seller has good title and whether my client should go forward.”   
On her way out, she adds, “Oh, yeahthe property is only worth about 
$50,000, and the client doesn’t want a big bill, so don’t spend too much 
time on it.”  With that, she leaves. 
“Reno, Nevada?” you ask yourself.  You have never even been to Las 
Vegas for vacationwhat do you know about real property in Nevada?  
You pick up the file and thumb through it.   
Schedule A
2
 describes the tract and indicates that Blackacre, Inc., owns 
a “fee” interest in the property.  So far, so good, you think, remembering 
Property I.
3
  Schedule A-1 is a little more confusingit is a list of notes and 
requirements, but they all seem fairly routinenotes of property taxes due, 
requirements to issue the policy, and the like.   
Then you start to review the Schedule B
4
 exceptions.  Part I of that 
schedule seems routineit lists easements, special assessments, and the 
like.
5
  This is all familiar stuff, and once you review the survey to make sure 
none of the easements run through the middle of the building, none of it 
gives you much heartburn.  But then you get to Part II.  That section of the 
report contains a long list of decidedly non-uniform items.  Some of them, 
like two tax liens owing to the State of Nevada, are not too 
disconcertingyou know what they are, and you know that such things are 
generally paid in connection with a sale.  Some of the exceptions, however, 
  
 1. A preliminary title report is the initial informational sheet prepared by a title insurance com-
pany that sets forth relevant issues affecting title.  See 1 C.J.S. Abstracts of Title § 2 (2011).  It does not 
have the legal consequences of an abstract of title, upon which one can legally rely, and is primarily used 
by title insurance companies as a way to induce potential stake holders to purchase insurance.  See id. at 
§§ 2, 21. 
 2. See, e.g., AM. LAND TITLE ASS’N OWNER’S POLICY OF TITLE INS., SCHEDULE A (2006), 
available at http://www.alta.org/forms/.    
 3. A fee simple absolute is the most complete form of ownership available to private parties.  
See JESSE DUKEMINIER, PROPERTY 193-94 (7th ed. 2010).  It is certainly what your client would want.   
 4. See, e.g., AM. LAND TITLE ASS’N OWNER’S POLICY OF TITLE INS., SCHEDULE B (2006), 
available at http://www.alta.org/forms/.  
 5. See, e.g., id. 
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are less clear.  One, in particular, indicates that there is a $40,000 Deed of 
Trust owing to an individual.  You remember reading about deeds of trust in 
law school and think that they are more or less the same thing as mortgages, 
but in your three years of practice, you have only seen mortgages (the 
instruments used in the state of Ohio).   
So, you do your best.  You draft a short and concise memorandum 
indicating to the partner that the seller appears to have a fee simple absolute 
encumbered by a number of minor tax liens and a larger deed of trust.  So 
long as these encumbrances are cleared off as part of the closing,
6
 you 
conclude, her client should be in good shape.  You hand the memo in and 
forget about it. 
Eighteen months later, the partner storms into your office.  “My client’s 
been sued!  What did you do?!” 
After calming down a bit, she explains the situation: the trust deed 
lender claims that its lien still has priority, and on top of that, a creditor of 
the prior owner (from whom your client’s seller bought the property five 
years ago) claims he still has an interest.  Both have sued your client. 
“Didn’t you check these issues out?” the partner asks.  “Didn’t you tell 
me we could buy from this seller?”   
You try to explainyou relied on the preliminary report and what it 
told you.  She had told you to be brief and efficient, so you had not ordered 
the underlying documents from the title company, or devoted a lot of time 
to researching Nevada forms and documents. 
“But what about these claims?” she insists.  “Even if you didn’t see 
them, don’t the recorded documents protect us?  Don’t they limit what these 
plaintiffs can do at this point?” 
You start to say “yes” to defend yourself, but you stop.  You do not 
know.  You have never seen an actual deed of trust, and you simply 
assumed that the seller had fee simple by way of a special warranty deed or 
some equivalent to that local document.  In truth, you do not know how the 
seller got the title, and you do not know what rights her creditors might still 
have.  All you know is that there are numerous documents affecting the 
parcel that may be entirely unlike the ones you have previously seen and 
  
 6. Most sales of real property are handled by an escrow agent utilizing an escrow account.  Such 
an account is “generally held in the name of the depositor and an escrow agent which is returnable to the 
depositor or paid to third persons on the fulfillment of escrow condition.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
378 (6th ed. 1997).  In effect, this requires parties, upon the pain of losing deposited funds, to accom-
plish contractual or other duties.  For example, if your client were to purchase Blackacre upon condition 
that the liens be cleared off, she would likely deposit the purchase funds into escrow with instructions 
that the funds not be released to the seller until the liens were cleared off (or that the funds be used to 
pay off the liens). 
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that you relied entirely on the title report.  You know less than it seems.  
You hope the client got title insurance.
7
  You are not alone. 
There is too much variability in the many different vesting documents
8
 
utilized throughout the country.  The United States contains more than 
3,000 counties and county equivalents,
9
 and each of them has their own 
recording system and customs.
10
  Relevant to this Article, many of these 
jurisdictions utilize different documents in an attempt to accomplish the 
same goal: to provide evidence of claims upon property.
11
  Unfortunately, 
this vesting heterogeneity has consequences.
12
   
Understanding these consequences is important.  As such, Part II 
examines the history of heterogeneity and how that development has created 
costs within our system.
13
  Real estate law has transformed over the last 200 
years from a local, parochial pursuit to a substantial engine of economic 
progress throughout the country and across jurisdictional lines.
14
 Disparate 
documents with varying consequences and effects means that some parties 
will make mistakes and that some parties will incur substantial costs to gain 
the local knowledge necessary to avoid such costs.
15
  This is particularly so 
when one looks at the purposes of the recording system and the extent to 
which vesting heterogeneity frustrates these purposes by making searching 
and utilization difficult and risky. 
Part III builds upon this understanding by looking at heterogeneity and 
its attendant cost through the lens of the numerus clausus, a theory that has 
been utilized to analyze a similar area of real estate law relating to 
uniformity.
16
  This theory has been propounded by Thomas Merrill and 
Henry Smith to describe and explain the effective limitation on property 
  
 7. Title insurance is generally understood to be indemnification provided by a title insurance 
company against loss that occurs if title ultimately inferior to what the title company indicated in its 
issued title policy.  See John C. Murray, Title and Survey Issues in Commercial Real Estate Transac-
tions, in UNDERSTANDING THE SOPHISTICATED REAL ESTATE PRACTICE 55, 57–58 (Practicing Law 
Institute ed., 2003).  Effectively, however, if your client can pursue you for malpractice, then you may 
end up indemnifying her for any potential loss.  In truth, then, you hope your client has title insurance 
other than you. 
 8. See infra note 53 for a detailed explanation of the term “vesting document.” 
 9. See How many counties are there in the United States?, USGS, 
http://gallery.usgs.gov/audios/124 (last visited July 17, 2012).  
 10. See Dale A. Whitman, Are We There Yet? The Case for a Uniform Electronic Recording Act, 
24 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 245, 269 (2002). 
 11. See id. at 260, 266. 
 12. See infra Part II.B. 
 13. See generally infra Part II.A. 
 14. See id. (discussing the evolution of recording systems); see also infra Part II.B (discussing 
the economic impact associated with the costs of recording, i.e. title searches, recording fees, etc.). 
 15. See generally id. 
 16. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: 
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (2000), as discussed infra Part III. 
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types at common law,
17
 and this Article proposes that the concept (by 
justifying the law’s hostility to new or different types of property in terms of 
informational burden) is relevant and helpful here.  This is particularly so 
given the theory’s firm establishment in the property law canon and given 
the analogies that can be drawn between property-type heterogeneity and 
vesting-document heterogeneity and between the informational burdens 
examined by Merrill and Smith and the heterogeneity costs identified 
herein.
18
   
Accordingly, the recording system, designed with the singular purpose 
of providing information to interested parties,
19
 should turn upon that same 
fulcrum of informationthat is, the determination of whether 
heterogeneous documents are permissible should be driven by whether such 
new documents provide good and helpful information to interested parties 
and the unique benefit of which exceeds the unique informational costs 
thereof.  This is how the numerus clausus works with respect to property 
forms, and how it should work here as well: by driving standardization 
based upon an informational cost-benefit analysis.  Having concluded as 
much, Part IV then demonstrates a potential application and finally proposes 
a market-based solution whereby this doctrine might be instituted in this 
realm of property law.
20
  
Based on this analysis, this Article concludes that the numerous types of 
documents, and the variability within those types, should not be present 
within our recording system.  The law should not ignore this type of 
heterogeneity in vesting documents, and the numerus clausus analysis 
provides an adequate vehicle for examining variability and determining 
when to impose uniformity. 
II.  VESTING HETEROGENEITY 
Where does this lack of uniformity come from, and what does it mean?  
As to its vesting heterogeneity, it is a symptom of our property system in 
general and our recording system in particular.  More than most other areas 
of law, property law is an amalgam of rules and customs that have accrued 
over time, tracing back to ancient England and carrying with them the 
weight and baggage of those times.
21
  Our recording system is no exception.  
  
 17. See id. 
 18. See generally id. 
 19. See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 577 (1988). 
 20. See infra Part IV. 
 21. See Jennifer Dick & Andrew Chandler, Shifting Sands: The Implementation of Lucas on the 
Evolution of Takings Law and South Carolina’s Application of the Lucas Rule, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & 
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Its development and history help explain the myriad types of vesting 
documents that are central thereto.  This explanation does not, however, 
mean that this variability is proficient.  The heterogeneity of documents 
creates real and significant costsboth in terms of actual transaction costs 
and in terms of mistakes made and errors overlooked.
22
  The result is an 
inefficient system that does not effectively accomplish its singular purpose: 
the communication of information.
23
   
A.  The Rise of Heterogeneity 
The heterogeneity underlying the myriad vesting documents utilized 
and recorded across the many different jurisdictions is due to a number of 
factors.  The first is the manner in which our recording system has 
evolved.
24
   
The basic goal of property law is to proscribe and define ownership 
rights in property,
25
 and a basic element of doing this is ensuring that 
interested parties can reasonably attain information regarding these 
ownership rights.  Without filling this informational role, property law 
could not function because ownership rights do not exist in a vacuumthey 
exist vis à vis other people and individuals, and that relationship cannot 
subsist unless the parties involved know everyone’s relative rights.26  The 
recording system takes care of this by incentivizing claimants to record their 
  
TR. J. 637, 690 (2003) (“Hundreds of years of English legal history have refined the law of custom and 
established it as a background principle of property law adopted by the states.”).  
 22. See infra Part II.B. 
 23. This is particularly notable, given the high burden placed upon the individualized information 
seeking inherent in the American recording system.  Some other countries use “Torrens,” or registration, 
systems and issue certificates of title, which serve as binding statements of the land’s title.  See, e.g., 
Dale A. Whitman, Digital Recording of Real Estate Conveyances, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 227, 232 
(1999).  The American recording system issues nothing.  “In effect, the system says to members of the 
public, ‘We won’t tell you who owns a parcel of land, but you are welcome to review all of the recorded 
documents that are held in our archives, and decide for yourself about the land’s ownership.’”  Id. at 228.  
One can be forgiven for expecting a system that requires reliance upon the pain of failure of title, as our 
system does, to require and provide clear and efficient information.  
 24. See generally Chad J. Pomeroy, Ending Surprise Liens on Real Property, 11 NEV. L.J. 139, 
143-48 (2011) (discussing the evolution of recording acts in the context of “surprise liens”); John H. 
Scheid, Down Labyrinthine Ways: Recording Acts Guide for First Year Law Students, 80 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 91, 92-101 (2002). 
 25. See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 577 (1988) 
(indicating that property law works when its “rules . . . signal to all of us, in a clear and distinct lan-
guage, precisely what our obligations are and how we may take care of our interests.”). 
 26. In other words, people “need some means of assuring that they share a common understand-
ing of . . . rights.”  Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The 
Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 382 (2002).  Without 
that, “parties may mistakenly make inconsistent uses of the asset or underuse the asset” or misallocate 
their limited resources.  Id.  
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vesting documents and then making those documents publicly known.
27
  In 
other words, vesting documents are the currency relied upon by the 
recording system to tell people what belongs to whom.
28
  As such, the 
evolution of the recording system itself tells us much about how vesting 
documents have evolved and why they are so varied. 
Initially, under English common law, there was no real recording 
system.
29
  Few people were mobile or literate, and land was rarely 
transferred and generally held in the same family throughout generations.
30
  
Accordingly, there was little need for centralized information systems 
detailing ownership information.
31
  When there was need, transfers were 
effected by witnessed ceremonies, which physically symbolized transfers 
and theoretically created somethingan actual act that occurred and was 
witnessedto which third parties could refer in attempting to understand 
who owned what.
32
  Once the physical ceremony occurred, ownership was 
transferred, and the prior owner could no longer affect title.
33
  This basic 
method of transfer acknowledged and institutionalized the “first in time, 
first in right” concept of ownership,34 even though it made it difficult for 
people to reference due to the lack of any permanent memorial of the 
transfer. 
This evidentiary problem was initially addressed by the Statute of Uses 
in 1535.
35
  This law was joined a year later by the Statute of Enrollments, 
which effectively required most real property transfers to be registered with 
a public official.
36
  This institution of record keeping would have greatly 
increased the informational access of interested parties to property 
information, but the Statute of Enrollments was unpopular and largely 
  
 27. See 14 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 82.01(1)(a) (Michael Allan 
Wolf ed., 2000) (“Recording acts, by definition, require the public preservation of written documents of 
title to land, or of other written evidences of certain proprietary interests.”).   
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Ray E. Sweat, Race, Race-Notice and Notice Statutes: The American Recording System, 
3 PROB. & PROP. 27, 27 (May 1989).  Title to real property was transferred by “enfeoffment,” a surren-
der and transfer of ownership rights from the transferor to the transferee.  See id.  This was accomplished 
through the livery of seisin, a ceremony involving the transfer of a piece of the ground, a twig, key, or 
other symbol.  See id. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. at 27; Pomeroy, supra note 24, at 145-48. 
 35. Sweat, supra note 32, at 27. 
 36. See George Lee Flint, Jr. & Marie Juliet Alfaro, Secured Transactions History: The First 
Chattel Mortgage Acts in the Anglo-American World, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1403, 1433-38 (2004). 
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ineffective.
37
  This haphazard state of affairs was largely regularized by the 
Statute of Frauds, passed in 1677.
38
  It did away with the exceptions that so 
badly riddled the Statutes of Uses and Enrollments and required written 
documents to create or transfer real property interests in most situations.
39
   
The requirement of a writing was still not sufficient, however, to 
provide the type of information necessary to regularly and effectively 
provide to interested parties the information necessary to understand the 
ownership rights affecting, and touching upon, a piece of property.
40
  The 
Statute of Frauds did not accomplish this task because vesting documents 
were physically conveyed to the transferee, along with the land.
41
  There 
was no central filing or storage system to track the documents that 
evidenced ownership—title was literally passed as the prior owner would 
prove up, and transfer, ownership by physically producing the vesting 
document.
42
  As such, there was still no real way to be sure who owned 
what.
43
   
Recording acts addressed this deficiency by requiring vesting 
documents to be recorded in order to have validity.
44
  The first modern 
recording act was adopted by the General Court of the Massachusetts Bay 
Colony in 1640.
45
  The act permitted unrecorded vesting documents 
between the parties to a given transaction, but it required a vesting 
document to be recorded to have validity against uninformed third parties.
46
   
  
 37. The registration requirement was easily avoided by transferring a leasehold estate (which did 
not have to be registered) and then immediately releasing the transferor’s reversionary interest to the 
lessee-transferee.  See Sweat, supra note 32, at 27. 
 38. See Alberto Luis Zuppi, The Parol Evidence Rule: A Comparative Study of the Common Law, 
the Civil Law Tradition, and Lex Mercatoria, 35 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 233, 236-37 (2007). 
 39. See id. at 236-37. 
 40. See Sweat, supra note 32, at 27. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See Dean Arthur R. Gaudio, Electronic Real Estate Records: A Model for Action, 24 W. NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 271, 272-74 (2002).  Owners rarely possessed a complete record of prior conveyances, and 
even those who did could not necessarily be trusted to produce all relevant vesting documents.  See id. at 
272.   
 44. See id.; Sweat, supra note 32, at 27-28. 
 45. See Sweat, supra note 32, at 27-28; 14 POWELL, supra note 27, § 82.01(1)(b).  The practice 
of recording written documents, practiced as far back as pre-conquest England, began to gain widespread 
acceptance and usage by colonial times.  See John Hanna, The Extension of Public Recordation, 31 
COLUM. L. REV. 617, 620 (1931).  At the time of America’s founding, land was shifting from its static 
role of wealth production to the dynamic role of a commodity to be bought and sold.  See Gaudio, supra 
note 43, at 272.  This shift was particularly pronounced in the new world, and the first known re-
cordation in America occurred in 1627 at Plymouth Colony.  See Sweat, supra note 32, at 27.  This shift 
intensified throughout the industrial revolution, and it is in this context that the colonies began to estab-
lish “American” land recording systems.  See id.  However, recording was not initially either mandatory 
or uniform.  See Hanna, supra, at 619-20.     
 46. See, e.g., NATHANIEL BRADSTREET SHURTLEFF, RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND 
COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND: 1642-1649, at 306 (1853).     
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Of particular note here, the first act adopted in Massachusetts described 
the required format of the vesting document.
47
  This makes inherently good 
sense: if one is interested in providing useful information to a potentially 
large population of interested third parties via a central repository, it seems 
reasonable to standardize the information going into and out of that 
repository.
48
  This institution of mandatory recording and the concomitant, 
minor steps toward standardization, represented an important change from 
the prior haphazard system.
49
  Providing at least some type of vesting 
information in an accessible manner was no longer a matter of local custom 
or technicality.
50
   
This new system was the foundation for the recording statutes of 
today.
51
  These acts, of course, eventually caught on throughout America, 
and all fifty states and the District of Columbia now have recording systems 
based upon these early forebears.
52
  However, neither the early iterations 
nor the more recent, modern acts are perfectly tailored to their purpose of 
providing information, particularly given the circumstances of modern 
commerce and custom.  This is so, in part, because of the heterogeneity of 
the very grist for these systems: the documents that are recorded.
53
   
Simply put, these documents are not consistent.  Deeds, mortgages, 
liens, and myriad other vesting documents all look different across 
jurisdictions, as our system’s ad hoc approach to recording has resulted in a 
  
 47. Sweat, supra note 32, at 27-28.  A valid vesting document had to contain the essential ele-
ments of the conveyance, such as the name of the grantor and grantee, a description of the property and 
estate granted, and the date of the transfer.  Id. 
 48. See infra Part I.B. 
 49. Sweat, supra note 32, at 27-28. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See Gaudio, supra note 43, at 272-74.  As the complexity and breadth of our real estate rec-
ords and dealings have grown, the manner in which local recorders take and keep information has be-
come more sophisticated.  Still, the basic goal of recording is the same: to provide information regarding 
title to interested parties. 
 52. See Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage 
Electronic Registration System, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1359, 1364 (2010).   
 53. For purposes of this Article, documents that pass title from one party to another are referred 
to as “vesting documents.”  Though this term is often used, it does not appear to be a term of art with a 
clear, settled definition.  However, the meaning adopted herein makes good sense, given the common 
language definition of the word “vest.”  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6, at 1083 (defining 
“to vest” as “to give an immediate, fixed right of present or future enjoyment”).  It also appears to be in 
accord with relevant authority.  See, e.g., Sintz v. Stone, 562 So.2d 228, 229 (Ala. 1990) (“A deed [is a] 
conveyance of realty . . . .”); Sun Valley v. Burt, 853 P.2d 607, 609 (Idaho 1993) (citing IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 55-813 (West 2012)) (“[A] conveyance . . . includes ‘every instrument in writing by which an 
estate or interest in real property is created, alienated, mortgaged, or encumbered, or by which the title to 
any real property may be affected, except wills.’”); Dixon v. Still, 121 A.2d 269, 272 (Md. Ct. App. 
1956) (speaking of deeds in the context of passing title).  See also, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 
565.1 (West 2012) (stating that, [C]onveyance of lands, . . . may be made by deed . . . .”); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 5302.171 (West 2012) (referring to deeds or other instruments “vesting title”).  
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variety of inconsistent views and requirements as to what can, or must, be 
recorded.
54
  This can be traced to the ad hoc evolution of recording 
described above.
55
  For instance, the early Massachusetts experiments with 
recording involved written summaries of the relevant documents.
56
  This 
soon evolved into copying the entire document into the public record books, 
so as to eliminate the risk of mistake or omission.
57
  This sort of evolution is 
consistent with that of the larger system and encompasses and explains the 
different types of documents that are utilized in different jurisdictions. 
The evolution can also be traced to the manner in which the documents 
themselves have evolved.  Consider, for example, the evolution of transfer 
deeds.  The earliest type of deed was the charter of feoffment.
58
  This deed 
involved the livery of seisin ceremony described above and passed into 
obsolescence with the passage of the Statute of Uses, in favor of a bargain 
and sale deed.
59
  In the more than 300 years since then, different kinds of 
deeds have come and gone, with the law presently settling on the general 
warranty deed, the special warranty deed, and the quitclaim deed.
60
  These 
deeds, however, are not precisely the same and can vary significantly, even 
within the same category.
61
  As such, even when the evolution of a vesting 
  
 54. Consider, for example, a hypothetical party that desires to file a security instrument to secure 
the performance of a non-monetary obligation with a piece of real property located in Nevada.  There is 
substantial uncertainty, from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, regarding the permissibility of such a “perfor-
mance deed of trust,” which secures something other than a liquidated obligation.  The general rule is 
that a mortgage can generally be given to secure any “contract, duty, or obligation” so long as that con-
tract, duty, or obligation “is capable of being reduced to a monetary value.”  See 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 
206; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 1.4 (2011).  This would permit the securing 
of obligations that are currently unliquidated but will become liquidated in the future and would prohibit 
securing obligations that are entirely imprecise (for instance, an obligation to “care and love mortgagee 
for the rest of mortgagor’s life.”).  There is no specific Nevada law on point, but some state statutes do 
appear to support the general proposition because they indicate that a trust deed can be given “to secure 
the performance of an obligation or the payment of any debt.”  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.020 (2009) 
(emphasis added).  However, some jurisdictions appear to disagree with this view in that they require an 
exact, extant debt at the time the security interest is given.  See, e.g., Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 
101 (Utah 1983).  This diversity of view on what is permitted will necessarily result in differing docu-
ments being adopted and utilized. 
 55. See Sweat, supra note 32, at 28.  There are, of course, broadly applicable rules that apply in 
all, or most, jurisdictions.  See id.  Every recording act operates under a “notice,” “race notice,” or “race” 
schema, the effect of which is to ensure that all claimants record their interests.  See id.  But the type and 
content of what must be recorded has never been systemically regulated.   
 56. See Whitman, supra note 23, at 234. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See DUKEMINIER, supra note 3, at 585. 
 59. See supra note 32 and accompanying text; See DUKEMINIER, supra note 3, at 585. 
 60. See DUKEMINIER, supra note 3, at 585-86. 
 61. See id. (discussing the different language that may be contained within deeds and the differ-
ent forms that might be utilized). 
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document narrows itself into a broad type or series of types, there is no true 
uniformity as to what gets recorded.
62
 
This is especially so when considered in the context of the thousands of 
different jurisdictions and recording systems present throughout the 
country.
63
  There is no central authority for these thousands of jurisdictions, 
so there are thousands of rules and norms dictating and defining what is and 
is not recordable.
64
  In other words, the basic nature of having such a vastly 
unregulated recording system inevitably instills into the system substantial 
variability.  Of course, the goal of most recording systems is the same, and 
they generally operate under broadly similar principles.  For example, 
recording generally involves presenting a copy, or an original, of the 
relevant document to a county recorder, who then time stamps, indexes, and 
files it.
65
  Most recording systems include two indexes—one that lists 
grantors alphabetically, and one that lists the grantee.
66
  An interested 
party—e.g., a potential purchaser or lender—can utilize these indexes in 
order to determine who owns title.
67
  So long as that generic goal is met, the 
system seems satisfied.   
However, there is great room for inconsistencies within these broad 
parameters.  Most notable here, there is no consistent requirement as to 
contentthe recording office is generally given basic parameters to review, 
which depend on the jurisdiction, and once those basic elements of a 
document are fulfilled, the office will record the document.
68
  This makes 
sense from a broader perspective, as the indexes are at that point 
  
 62. See David E. Ewan et al., It’s the Message, not the Medium!, 60 BUS. LAW. 1487, 1487 
(2005) (noting that jurisdictions use various types of deeds that are merely modeled after the system used 
in the seventeenth century). 
 63. There are approximately 3,600 counties, cities, or other municipalities that utilize a land 
recording system.  See id.  These different recording systems largely rely on “accepting paper documents 
(deeds or other documents affecting title to real property) for recordation.”  Id.   
 64. See id.  This fragmentation of administration compounds the existing heterogeneity of re-
cordable documents even more, then, by creating systemic variability based upon individualized defini-
tional and substantive requirements or prohibitions.  See Whitman, supra note 23, at 260-61 (discussing 
the “quirks and idiosyncrasies of individual county records, so commonly found today as a consequence 
of local conditions and political factors.”). 
 65. See Peterson, supra note 52, at 1365. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See id.  An interested party wants to know a number of things.  First, it wants to know wheth-
er the prospective seller has already sold or mortgaged the property.  To determine this, it will look for 
the seller’s name in the grantee index to determine who transferred title to the grantee.  See id.  It will 
continue tracing back through all grantees until it finds the original source of title and thereby establish a 
chain of title.  See id.  Next, the interested party will search the grantor index to ensure that the seller has 
not sold or otherwise compromised title.  See Peterson, supra note 52, at 1365.  Finally, the interested 
party will attempt to find a release for any mortgage that has ever been given on the property, by any 
past or present owner.  See id.  At this point, the interested party will have confidence that the seller has 
clear title.  See id. 
 68. See id. 
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theoretically usefula given office has theoretically filled its basic goal of 
permitting others to track down all recorded vesting documents.
69
  But each 
office has done so somewhat differently, creating a system with different 
documents in different jurisdictions.
70
   
For all these reasons, it is easy to see why our recording system 
functions the way it does in permitting so many different document types.  
The history of its development, the evolution of recordable documents and 
deeds, and the basic ad hoc operation of a decentralized recording system 
have all led to a laissez faire approach to document content.  This is 
“enough,” in that it provides the minimum information necessary, but it is 
not designed to be easy to search or efficient to access and so creates 
substantial cost.
 71
   
B.  The Cost of Heterogeneity 
One way to measure the cost of the heterogeneity described above is to 
examine the extent to which it detracts from the underlying purpose of the 
recording system.  In order to do this, one must examine the system and its 
operation in more detail.   
As set forth above, the generic purpose of recording systems is to 
provide information to interested users.
72
  This is, of course, a basic concern 
of property law
73
 and is easy to discern with respect to recording systems 
based on the historical evolution described above, concerned as it is with the 
development of the commercial potential of real property and the interests 
of potential purchasers and lenders.
74
  However, a more thorough 
understanding of this purpose is necessary to understand the true cost of the 
heterogeneity described above.   
This search for purpose begins by examining the incentives created by 
the basic operation of the typical recording system.  Such a system 
incentivizes parties to record by invalidating unrecorded transfers of real 
property interests in favor of subsequent transferees.
75
  It is clear that part of 
the reason for this relatively harsh result is certaintyvoiding prior, 
  
 69. See infra Part II.B. for a more detailed view of the recording system’s goals.  
 70. See generally Ewan, supra note 62, at 1487; see also Whitman, supra note 23, at 260-61. 
 71. See, e.g., infra Part II.B. 
 72. See Rose, supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 73. This concern with how to ensure that interested parties have, or can attain, information re-
garding possessory and ownership rights is at the very heart of what property law doesit proscribes 
and defines the rights of ownership in property.  See Rose, supra note 25, at 577. 
 74. See supra Part II.A. 
 75. See Dan S. Schechter, Judicial Lien Creditors Versus Prior Unrecorded Transferees of Real 
Property: Re-Thinking the Goals of the Recording System and their Consequences, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 
105, 109 (1988). 
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unrecorded transfers incentivizes regular recording and so ensures accurate 
information.
76
  This is not the only reason, however.  If it were, then all 
unrecorded interests would be void, and that is not how the system 
operates.
77
  An unrecorded transfer is voided only when a qualified, later 
transferee properly challenges the earlier, unrecorded conveyance.
78
  In 
other words, the system invalidates too few transfers for certainty to be its 
sole goal.
79
 
On the other hand, another clear goal of recording systems is to 
discourage fraud.
80
  Without a recording system to impart ownership 
information, grantors could fraudulently convey the same interest multiple 
times.
81
  Again, however, the actual operation of the recording system belies 
this as a stand-alone goalif it were, the system would likely invalidate 
fraudulent transfers and no others.
82
  But it does not do that.  Instead, it 
invalidates transfers based upon objective criteria not related to fraud, which 
certainly results in the voiding of many non-fraudulent transfers.
83
  In other 
words, the system invalidates too many transfers for fraud to be its sole 
goal.
84
  
Thus, looking at either the goal of certainty or the goal of fraud 
deterrence is unhelpful.  Looking at the two goals together, however, is 
fruitful.
85
  Again, the system invalidates too few unrecorded transfers for 
certainty to be the sole goal, but too many for fraud deterrence to be the sole 
goal.  So the question becomes why does the system leave some transfers 
intact and invalidate others?  The answer appears to focus primarily upon 
the potential injury and the actual knowledge of the party that would benefit 
from the avoidance of a prior interest.  In particular, transferees must 
exchange value for their interest (that is, have a real, potential injury) and be 
  
 76. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Examina-
tion of the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REV. 175, 183 (1983). 
 77. See Schechter, supra note 75, at 110.   
 78. Id.  An unrecorded transfer must be challenged, and it must be challenged by a qualified 
transferee.  See id.  This deviation from uniformly voiding all unrecorded transfers necessarily results in 
some uncertainty. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See SHURTLEFF, supra note 46, at 306.  An explicit goal of early recording laws was to ad-
dress the problem of fraudulent conveyances.  See Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Recording of Deeds in the 
Colony of Massachusetts Bay, 28 B.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1948).  In fact, preventing fraudulent conveyances 
might have been the primary goal of these initial acts.  Certain amendments to the Massachusetts statute 
indicate, for example, that recording was required only where a grantor retained possession of the prop-
erty following the transfer of an interest.  See id.  This focus evinces a preoccupation with circumstances 
that might confuse third parties and other types of potentially fraudulent arrangements. 
 81. See Schechter, supra note 75, at 110-11. 
 82. See id. at 111. 
 83. See id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See id. at 113-20. 
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ignorant of the prior interest (that is, not be able to reasonably avoid the 
injury) in order to trigger the recording system’s avoidance powers.86  This 
has been termed a “cost avoidance” rationale and explains, in theoretical 
and more nuanced terms, the evolution of the recording system that can be 
discerned from an examination of the history discussed above: the goal of 
the recording system is to permit interested commercial actors (i.e., those 
exchanging value for a property interest) who need ownership information 
(i.e., those who do not already possess such information) to obtain that 
information in a reliable manner.
87
 
So, returning to the issue at hand, does countenancing and accepting a 
very wide range of potentially recordable documents
88
 accomplish this task 
in an acceptable way?  From the perspective of whether heterogeneity 
negatively affects the purpose of the recording systemthe question set 
forth at the beginning of this sectionthe answer is “no.”89  Heterogeneity 
is not acceptable because it makes organization and searching difficult and 
expensive and so effectively restricts the access sought by interested 
commercial actors.
90
   
  
 86. See Schechter, supra note 75, at 113-20 (discussing two hypothetical transfers, one to a donee 
and one to a purchaser for less than market value and inducing the purpose behind the system’s negative 
treatment of the former and positive treatment of the latter).  Injury, then is required, though relative 
harm is not part of the calculus.  See, e.g., Cunningham v. Norwegian Lutheran Church of Am., 184 P.2d 
834, 840 (Wash. 1947) (upholding a bona fide purchase for value even though buyer purchased for only 
$100 real estate valued at $1,500). 
 87. See Schechter, supra note 75, at 119 (“We may label the preceding descriptive theory as the 
‘cost avoidance’ rationale, because the system (1) requires that the subsequent transferee be likely to 
suffer costs in the absence of protection; and (2) requires that the parties take action to avoid those 
costs.”).  The system is simple; it does not attempt to balance potential injury or relative costs.  See id.  
This may be a form of rough justice, eschewing perfect the expense of balancing in favor of a simple and 
easily understood system.  See id.  This, again, comports with a system focused primarily on the provi-
sion of information.   
 88. Recall, again, just how much variability is inherent in the recording system.  See Ewan, supra 
note 62, at 1487.  The heterogeneity described herein is, as we have seen, an organic element of the 
system, existing as it does due to the natural, historical evolution of the system.  But this bred-in varia-
bility is even worse than that, as it is amplified across the more than three thousand jurisdictions present 
in the United States.  See id.  In other words, the raw number of systems involved materially affects 
every aspect of the system.   
 89. Another way of stating this is to ask whether heterogeneity is “efficient” under an economic 
analysis of the law.  Broadly put, economic analysis of the law is an approach to legal analysis that 
applies microeconomic theories, such as cost-benefit analyses, to legal issues.  See STEPHEN M. 
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 18-19 (2002).  From a positive perspective, econom-
ic analysis can be utilized to explain the development and current state of the law regarding the hetero-
geneity of vesting documents.  See Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 
757, 768 (1975).  As such, the question here would be whether the current system of permitting the 
recording of differing types of vesting documents is economically justifiable.  Any decrease in cost 
would make the dissemination of information more economical and so more efficient.  
 90. See supra note 87 and accompanying text for an explanation of the intended user of a record-
ing system, as reflected by its actual operation. 
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This point can be made another way by examining a salient area of 
research from a different academic field.  Database theory research arises in 
the context of computer science and focuses on the organization and 
structure of database information.
91
  The title records created and collected 
by the recording systems (that is, necessarily created and filed by 
individuals who do not want their property interests to be voided because 
they have not properly recorded) constitute, in effect, a large, shared data 
bank.  And there has been significant research into the manner in which 
such data banks are organized and the manner in which they can and should 
be accessed and utilized.
92
   
In particular, computer scientists have studied and compared different 
database organizational models that are relevant here.  The first model of 
note is the relational view (or model) of data.
93
  Under this first database 
model, a compound piece of information is broken into component pieces 
and organized into tables with structured columns (fields) and rows 
(records).
94
  The second model of note is the “flat” view (or model) of data.  
Under this second database model, a compound piece of information is not 
broken into component pieces, but rather stored in a single retrieval space.
 95
  
  
 91. See, e.g., Mohammad Chulam Ali, Evolution of Database Emerging to Sybase Adaptive 
Server Enterprise and Ensuring Better Server Performance Tuning and Query Optimization, 35 INT’L J. 
COMPUTER APPLICATIONS 37, 38-39 (2011). 
 92. See generally E.F. Codd, A Relational Model of Data for Large Shared Data Banks, 13 
COMMUNICATIONS ACM 377 (June 1970) (“This paper is concerned with the application of elementary 
relation theory to systems which provide shared access to large banks of formatted data.”).  Accessing 
large pools of data is something that we tend to take for granted.  Think, for example, of the last time 
you utilized Westlaw or LexisNexis to do legal research.  Or think of the last time you used Google or 
Bing to search for anything on the internet.  In today’s world, there is an enormous amount of infor-
mation collected and available electronicallythat is, there is a huge shared data bank available in 
various formats, including, but not limited to, the internet itselfbut this information is only useful to 
the extent that you can access it efficiently and effectively (hence the popularity and success of effective 
“search engines”). 
 93. See id.  This paper is significant in that it sets forth, for the first time, the concept of a rela-
tional database, which is now the standard.  See Chulam Ali, supra note 91, at 37-40.  Prior to Mr. 
Codd’s work, databases tended to be “flat.”  Id.    
 94. See Codd, supra note 92, at 379-82. 
 95. See id.  An example may be useful.  In a traditional, “flat” database, information is stored in a 
distinct, comprehensive text file (i.e., File #1: Jonathan Airy, 01/01/2010, PN 12345, Mortgage Interest; 
File #2: Rebecca Bender, 06/01/2010, PN 12345, Mechanics Lien; ad finitum).  This organizational 
format makes it difficult to search for specific information or to isolate relevant bits of information or 
data because one has to search each and every text file to gather the necessary information.  See id.  The 
relational model, on the other hand, is far more flexible and efficient, because it utilizes a table to store 
information, breaking the component pieces of information into separate bits.  See Chulam Ali, supra 
note 91, at 38-39.  Standard fields and records are put into a table format, such as the following: 
 
Name Date Parcel Number Type of Interest 
Jonathan Airy 01/01/2010 PN 12345 Mortgage Interest 
Rebecca Bender 06/01/2010 PN 12345 Mechanics Lien 
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The relational model is widely considered to be more efficient than, and 
superior to, the flat model because it is easier and more efficient to organize 
and sort information.
96
 
These differing models are relevant here in that standardized documents 
permit the construction of a relational model, whereas non-standardized 
documents force one to use a flat model.  This is so because the relational 
database organization requires that the initial compound piece of 
information be structured in a standardized manner.
97
  It is simply not 
possible to create tables that can be consistently populated and thereafter 
systemically searched by field unless they consist of standardized, 
structured input.
98
  As such, homogeneity of vesting documents would 
permit the use of a relational model, whereas heterogeneity of vesting 
documents ensures the use of a flat model.  As the flat model is more 
difficult to organize and access, it will be more costly to search for 
information and access the information found (which is, ultimately, the goal 
of the recording system). 
An example may help to make the point.  Assume that Jurisdiction A 
requires all deeds of trust to contain only the following information: parcel 
number, name of trustor, name of beneficiary, name of trustee, and amount 
secured.  Each time a deed of trust (a compound piece of information) is 
recorded, it can be broken into the component pieces of information 
referenced above and placed into a table.  In that manner, any interested 
party could quickly and easily search for deed of trust encumbrances by 
parcel number, by beneficiary (lender), by trustor, or by any other singular 
piece of data required.  Now assume that Jurisdiction A has no standardized 
requirements.  Perhaps it requires some information, but does not limit other 
information, or perhaps it does not require anything in particular beyond the 
name of the grantor and the legal description.
99
  Each time a deed of trust is 
recorded, the county recorder will simply take the document (which may be 
one page or thousands of pages) and record it against the relevant parcel.  
The only way, then, for an interested party to search is by legal description 
  
 
This type of table organization permits one to quickly and easily compare isolated pieces of information, 
across all relevant fields because the information is organized, and searchers can focus on the relevant 
column or row.  See Codd, supra note 92, at 379. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See Chulam Ali, supra note 91, at 38-39. 
 98. This is self-evident from the nature of the organization.  If the information is not structured 
by type (i.e., the same fields), there will be no table.  Instead, there will merely be a series of unique 
information compilations, as in the traditional “flat” database model.  See Codd, supra note 92, at 379-
82. 
 99. It is not conceivable that a recording system would not require a parcel number or legal 
description, as the document at issue must be recorded against some piece of real property. 
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or grantorthe system is inflexible and may be confusing, depending on 
how many different documents are recorded and how much information 
each such document contains (or does not contain).  Moreover, even once it 
is found, the document is likely to be difficult to access and understand 
because it is not standardized.
100
 
In other words, our recording system is one, large, outdated database.  
As such, we are left with a structure that is, by its very nature, costly and 
inefficient.  It exists to make information available to the right parties at the 
right time, but it does not perform this function well.  It does work, in a 
limited way, in that it harnesses some perceptible and retrievable 
information into a format that provides some level of notice.
101
  The system 
merely ensures a baseline level of informational access, without regard to 
cost or effectiveness.  It is not surprising, then, that there is little efficiency 
and that, for the all the reasons set forth above, heterogeneity makes it more 
difficult and more costly for interested parties to retrieve and access the type 
of information the system is designed to propagate.
102
  This relationship 
between variability and cost is not unique to vesting documents.  Indeed, 
  
 100. This difficulty might arise because individuals, having been given free reign, may have 
created dense and difficult documents.  However, even if the documents are not difficult (or not more 
difficult than a hypothetically uniform jurisdiction), it will necessarily take more time (i.e., create more 
cost) to review because of the variability involved.  Any lack of standardization will require either an 
entirely unique review of each document or a relatively more careful review of each document than what 
would be required if the documents were standardized (even if that given document is comparatively 
simple), thus building in an inevitable “review premium.” 
 101. Indeed, the system functions by way of title attorneys and insurers carefully searching the 
records to find all information that the potentially interested party will be deemed to possess by the 
recording system.  See John W. Fisher, II, The Scope of Title Examinations in West Virginia Revisited, 
111 W. VA. L. REV. 641, 642 (2009).  This is a difficult job, by its naturethe title examiner must 
search all relevant records for the appropriate time frames and recognize the legal significance of the 
information discovered.  See id.   
 102. Indeed, it is at least partially due to this reason that the title industry is a multi-billion dollar 
industry, generating $8.7 billion dollars in premiums in 2010 alone.  See Press Release, A.M. Best Co., 
A.M. Best Special Report: Despite Economic Turbulence, Title Industry Outlook Remains Stable (Oct. 
10, 2011), http://www3.ambest.com/Frames/Frameserver.asp?site=press&Tab=1&altsrc=2&RefNum= 
65494655775346556649.  This cost, then, is very real and very significant to the public at large.  There 
is some indication that modern actors have endeavored to address this by way of the establishment and 
operation of private “title plants.”  See Whitman, supra note 23, at 227.  A title plant contains duplicates 
of public records but indexes them by land parcel rather than by name and are a clear attempt to counter 
the plain fact that a system developed for an agrarian society with a small population has been forced to 
expand to serve thousands of jurisdictions with millions of residents and hundreds of thousands of land 
parcels.  See id.  While these title plants may help with some issues, they do not, and cannot, however, 
address the basic problem raised herein: the lack of structured information with which they deal.  Re-
gardless of who maintains the information, or in what manner they do so, this underlying heterogeneity 
will continue to ensure that it is difficult and costly to perceive information. 
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there is well-established and well-studied authority that has examined an 
analogous situation and has similarly found heterogeneity is costly.
103
   
III.  THE NUMERUS CLAUSUS  
Hostility toward that which is “different,” based upon the costs inherent 
in heterogeneity, is not new.  Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith have 
previously propounded what they call the numerus clausus theory, which 
posits an explanation as to why the law and the courts have traditionally 
been hostile to new and different types of property forms and have 
eschewed heterogeneity in favor of uniformity.
104
  According to Merrill and 
Smith, the reason for this hostility is the high cost of “newness,” the 
acceptance and permission of which causes others to spend time and energy 
discerning parties’ relative rights.105  This cost, arising from the 
informational burdens of new property types, is highly analogous to the 
vesting heterogeneity costs identified above.  As such, it is useful here to 
examine in greater detail both the theory itself and the costs identified by 
Merrill and Smith, upon which the theory turns. 
A.  The Theory 
The numerus clausus describes the manner in which property law 
restricts parties’ discretion to shape or customize their ownership interests 
according to their own desire.
106
  People cannot create new or different 
types of property to fit new and different circumstances or 
situationsproperty law recognizes only a limited number of basic property 
forms or types and refuses to allow parties to stray from these set categories 
or “boxes.”107  This rule is explicitly accepted in civil law countries, which 
acknowledge the concept and refer to it by name (the “numerus clausus,” 
  
 103. See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 35-38 (analogizing the “inventory of property 
rights” with the “lexicon of a language” and the risks of standardization which can result in frustrating 
purposes and raising costs).  
 104. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 3-5.  See generally Henry E. Smith, Community and 
Custom in Property, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 5, 34-36 (2009); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. 
Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 385-88 (2001).   
 105. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 5-6.   
 106. See id. at 3. This is in contrast to contract law, which is not generally limited as to type or 
duration.  See id.  There may be some narrow limits based on public policy, but, once a promise meets 
the legal elements of contract law, the law will honor almost any contract, no matter how unusual the 
promise, the consideration, or the length and nature of the contractual relationship.  See id.   
 107. See id. (citing Keppell v. Bailey, (1834) 39 Eng. Rep. 1042 (Ch.) 1049 (“[I]ncidents of a 
novel kind [cannot] be devised and attached to property at the fancy or caprice of any owner.”).  Merrill 
and Smith latch on to the phraseology in this case to describe their thesis that the law will not permit 
“fancies” based upon the numerus clausus.  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 25. 
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which means “the number is closed”).108  The concept is not explicitly 
acknowledged or labeled in our common law, but it can be seen here.
109
 
Historically, the courts have followed and enforced the numerus clausus 
by either striking down parties’ attempts to create new interests or recasting 
any attempted “fancy” as something else that fits within the law’s traditional 
oeuvre.
110
  This is apparent with respect to all property types now familiar to 
us.   
Estates in land are the most obvious example.  There are five types of 
possessory estates (the fee simple absolute, the defeasible fee simple, the fee 
tail, the life estate, and the lease) and a similar number of corresponding 
future interests (reversions, termination powers, remainders, and executory 
interests).
111
  The courts rarely vary from this “formalistic, box-like 
structure.”112  Regardless of whether the parties want to create a new type of 
property interest, courts will honor the numerus clausus concept by refusing 
to honor that intent and expand the type of interests allowed.
113
  This strict 
  
 108. See id. at 5. 
 109. See id. at 4 (citing John Henry Merryman, Policy, Autonomy, and the Numerus Clausus in 
Italian and American Property Law, 12 AM. J. COMP. L. 224 (1963)); Bernard Rudden, Economic Theo-
ry v. Property Law: The Numerus Clausus Problem, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE: THIRD 
SERIES 239, 240 (John Eekelaar & John Bell eds., 1987). 
 110. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 11 (describing the numerus clausus as a “norm of 
judicial self-governance,” functioning like a canon of interpretation applicable to common-law decision 
making or like a “strong default rule in the interpretation of property rights.”).  The example given by 
Merrill and Smith serves to make the point: landlord-tenant law is affected by the numerus clausus 
insofar as leases are limited to four types: the term of years lease, the periodic tenancy, the tenancy at 
will, and the tenancy at sufferance.  See id.  And the courts will not gladly permit any deviation there-
from.  A lease “for the duration of the war,” for instance, would almost certainly not be enforced accord-
ing to its terms.  Seeking to place such a lease within one of the four recognized “boxes” of ownership, a 
court would probably shoehorn the lease into category of periodic tenancy or a tenancy at will.  See id. at 
11-12.  But see Garner v. Gerrish, 473 N.E.2d 223, 225 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1984) (characterizing an interest 
as a “life tenancy terminable at the will of the tenant.”).  There is no such thing as a lifetime lease at 
common law, so such an interest would fall outside the recognized categories and so constitute a depar-
ture from the numerus clausus.  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 22-23 (discussing Garner, 473 
N.E.2d 223).  Still, the point is well taken, with significant supporting authority.  See id. at 3-4 (citing 1 
RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 11.01, at 11-12 (Patrick J. Rohan ed., 1999); 
CHARLES DONAHUE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
CONCEPT AND THE INSTITUTION 457 (3d ed. 1993); JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 
204 (4th ed. 1998); LEWIS M. SIMES & ALLAN F. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 61, at 45-46 
(2d ed. 1956)).  These authorities all refer, to some extent, to property interests as being a closed or 
standardized system.  Merrill and Smith believe that courts and scholars generally honor this conception 
of property despite their protestations to the contrary:  “They treat previously-recognized forms of prop-
erty as a closed list that can be modified only by the legislature.”  Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 10-
11. 
 111. See id. at 12-13; see also DUKEMINIER, supra note 3, at 183-316. 
 112. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 13 (quoting CURTIS J. BERGER & JOAN C. WILLIAMS, 
PROPERTY: LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE 211 (4th ed. 1997)). 
 113. See, e.g., Stuehm v. Mikulski, 297 N.W. 595, 603 (Neb. 1941) (Carter, J., concurring) (“It is 
essential that titles and estates in land be definite and certain.  It is not a field in which the court should 
undertake to establish that it is liberal and modernistic in keeping pace with changing conditions.  The 
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approach extends to all types of property.  Concurrent interests,
114
 
nonpossessory interests,
115
 personal property,
116
 and intellectual property
117
 
all receive the same treatmenteven though the courts never use the term 
“numerus clausus,” they steadfastly follow its precepts and deny parties the 
right to create new interests of their own choosing.
118
   
Interestingly, one “property type” not mentioned by Merrill and Smith 
is that of a secured lien.  The creditor-recipient of a security interest is the 
holder of a property interest, albeit one that does not fit into the schema 
identified above.
119
  And, similar to the categories examined above, these 
  
creation of hybrid estates unknown to the common law is to be deplored.”).  This is not to say that prop-
erty cannot be customized in other ways.  So long as the customization falls within one of the accepted 
categories of property in that it does not stray outside acknowledged, basic legal dimensions, then the 
courts will accept it.  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 14. 
 114. With respect to concurrent interests, American common law recognizes a very basic cata-
logue of property: joint tenancy; marital property; trusts; and condominiums, cooperatives, and time-
shares.  See id. at 15 (citing 5 POWELL, supra note 110, § 40.500, at 40-43; 7 RICHARD R. POWELL, 
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 49.01, at 49-52 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2001)).  The failure of the 
judiciary to respond to changing social norms affecting women’s rights and commercial pressure regard-
ing cooperative housing (leaving the legislature to do so by, for example, abolishing dower and curtesy 
and passing condominium and time-share statutes) speaks to the judiciary’s self-imposed reluctance.  See 
id.   
 115. The same judicial reluctance is evident with respect to nonpossessory interests.  Easements, 
covenants, equitable servitudes, and profits have also been remarkably stable and unchanged by the 
courts.  See id. at 16-17.  Equitable servitudes are themselves an exception, as they were created by the 
judiciary, but that was more than 160 years ago and has been effectively limited in both scope and appli-
cation.  See id. (citing Tulk v. Moxhay, (1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch.) 1143).   
 116. Judicial treatment of personal property has been, if anything, even more restrictive than that 
of the other property interests discussed herein.  There is little case law to support the idea that the own-
ership of personal property can be divided in any significant manner, and almost all attempts to create 
nuanced property interests in personal property take place in the context of trust law.  Merrill & Smith, 
supra note 16, at 17-18. 
 117. Finally, intellectual property also shows the effects of the numerus clausus.  Historically, 
there has been no real protection for creative property outside the legislative dictates of patent, copyright, 
trademark, and trade secret.  See generally DUKEMINIER, supra note 3, at 56-96.  This has eroded some-
what over time, with the common law development of the “hot news” doctrine and the right of publicity, 
but these developments have not been so intrusive, or so significant, as to materially undermine the 
apparent role of the numerus clausus in property law.  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 19-20 
(discussing Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 245 (1918)); see also White v. Samsung 
Elec. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 512 (9th Cir. 1992).   
 118. See id. at 5-6. 
 
The principle that property forms are fixed and limited in number represents an extremely 
important qualification to the principle of freedom of contract . . . A willing buyer and a 
willing seller can create an infinite variety of enforceable contracts for the exchange of 
recognized property rights, and can describe these property rights along a multitude of 
physical dimensions and prices.  But common-law courts will not enforce an agreement to 
create a new type of property right. 
 
Id. 
 119. See, e.g., Christopher L. Peterson, Two Faces: Demystifying the Mortgage Electronic Regis-
tration System’s Land Title Theory, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 111, 139-40 (identifying a secured lien as 
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lienhold interests generally fit within an easily identifiable “box.”  Here, 
almost all secured lien interests in real property are either a mortgagor 
interest or a beneficiary interest arising from a deed of trust.
120
  Similarly, 
almost all secured lien interests in personal property arise within the context 
of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) and so fit within the relatively 
narrow bands of creativity permitted therein.
121
  In other words, even if one 
broadens the scope of potential property interests at issue beyond what 
Merrill and Smith have examined, our system still honors the closed system 
of the numerus clausus.
122
  And, as mentioned above, it does so without 
  
a property interest); Peter Soskin, Protecting Title in Continental Europe and the United States–
Restriction of a Market, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 411, 413 (2011) (identifying a secured lien as a property 
interest).  Of course, the phrase “property interest” can be interpreted widely in a number of different 
contexts.  See, e.g., O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 781 n.12 (1980) (discussing 
shifting views of the definition of “property interest”).  However, it seems reasonable to define a proper-
ty interest, in the context of our discussion of the numerus clausus, which speaks broadly to all property 
types, as something approximating the following: “a legal right of one person enforceable against anoth-
er person or class of persons with respect to the possession, enjoyment and/or alienation of a thing.”  
Jeanne L. Schroeder, A Repo Opera: How Criimi Mae got Repos Backward, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 565, 
580 (2002).  This makes sense in that the numerus clausus applies in the context of real and personal 
property and how the law defines the types of ownership cognizable therein.  It also makes sense in that 
it focuses on the in rem nature of property law, which is key to understanding the basis for the numerus 
clausus and how that applies to heterogeneous vesting documents.  See infra Part II.B. 
 120. See, e.g., GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 593 (rev. 
2d ed. Supp. 2011).  But see supra note 54.  The “performance deed of trust” contemplated therein may 
be construed as giving rise to a new type of interest and hence undermining the numerus clausus con-
cept.  On the other hand, as set forth in supra note 54, such an interest would likely be permitted only to 
the extent that it met the rules applicable to historical lienhold interests, thereby effectively mimicking 
the substantive elements thereof.  This sort of “soft” pressure is precisely the manner in which our com-
mon law courts have enforced the numerus clausus, as is discussed in greater detail below. 
 121. See, e.g., 8 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND ET AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES, Article 9. 
Secured Transactions; Sales of Accounts and Chattel Paper, § 9-102:1 (West 2011) (describing the broad 
scope of Article 9 as it relates to personal property). 
 122. One potentially significant counter example, however, arises in the context of the lienhold 
interests not examined by Merrill and Smith and relates to the relatively recent advent of the Mortgage 
Electronic Registration System (“MERS”).  See generally Pomeroy, supra note 24, at 162-64.  MERS is 
a private database that tracks ownership and assignments of mortgages.  See Beau Phillips, MERS: The 
Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 63 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 262, 263 (2009). Beginning 
approximately 20 years ago, the mortgage industry began to evolve in numerous ways.  See id. at 262.  
One aspect of this was to separate the servicing of loans and the ownership of loans from each other and 
to further separate the ownership of loans from the holder of the underlying note.  See id.  This latter 
innovation is often associated with dividing the ownership of a loan, or a bundle of multiple loans, 
among various owners (often occurring in connection with the packaging of mortgages into mortgage-
backed securities).  In such a situation, none of the owners of the underlying note ever hold the note, 
have any real contact with the buyer (and often the originator), or even know who the borrower, or what 
the collateral, is.  See, e.g., Kurt Eggert, Held up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and 
the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 546-48 (2002).  Traditionally, separat-
ing ownership from form in this manner would cause difficulty because the parties would have to pre-
pare and record an assignment of the security instrument to be recorded in the appropriate recording 
office.  See Mortgages: MERS and Foreclosures, 39 REAL EST. L. REP. 1, 1-2 (Oct. 2009).  This was 
cumbersome, costly, and often caused confusion and chain of title problems.  See id.  MERS addressed 
these problems by streamlining and simplifying the process.  See Phillips, supra, at 263.  It eliminated 
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explicitly recognizing or explaining whythat is, without even 
acknowledging the numerus clausus principle.
123
  
It is, then, something of a “stealth doctrine.”124  Merrill and Smith have 
identified a relatively unknown decision that they tepidly endorse as a 
“leading case,”125 but its very lack of impact speaks to the subtle standing of 
the numerus clausus in the common law.  In Johnson v. Whiton,
126
 Royal 
Whiton devised land to his granddaughter “and her heirs on her father’s 
side.”127  The court construed this devise as an attempt to create a new type 
of property interest (i.e., a new type of estate) and specifically disapproved 
of the attempt.
128
  Instead, it ruled, Royal’s granddaughter received a fee 
simple absolute.
129
   
Merrill and Smith see this as a seminal case of sorts, both because it has 
the hallmarks of a case that one might think other authorities would be 
attracted to,
130
 and because it so nicely fits their description and view of the 
numerus clausus as a widely controlling, but subtle and unnamed, rule of 
  
the need for a new assignment each time a secured obligation was sold, traded, or securitized by creating 
a privatized, internal system that tracked ownership information for its members.  See id.   MERS mem-
bers, in exchange for an annual fee, have the ability to appoint MERS as their agent with respect to 
registered mortgages.  Id.  After they have done so, MERS is the mortgagee of record, and members can 
then trade these registered mortgages among themselves via MERS internal records and without record-
ing any assignments.  Id.  MERS remains the nominee for the owner, whoever it is, and regardless of 
how often the mortgage is pooled, dissected, or sold.  Id.  The recorded mortgage is never assigned on 
public records but retains its priority: under common law, as a nominee, or under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, as a transferee or as a holder of a note indorsed in blank, MERS has standing to bring a fore-
closure on behalf of the owner or owners of a note in default.  See, e.g., Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 
Inc. v. Azize, 965 So. 2d 151, 154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).  The process is without cost and remains 
unknown outside the MERS system.  The relevant question this raises here is whether a “MERS mort-
gage” is, in fact, a new and different type of property interest.  As discussed and described above, prop-
erty interests are types of ownership that can be consistently categorized based upon identifiable legal 
attributes such as the rights and obligations of owners and duration.  See Sweat, supra note 32 and ac-
companying text.  By lessening the obligations of owners of secured liabilities and increasing their rights 
to assign and transfer, then, MERS arguably creates a new property type.  This would undermine Merrill 
and Smith’s support for the numerus clausus, particularly given the recent and vast expansion of MERS.  
The system has grown exponentially since its creation, with MERS claiming that it is now the nominal 
mortgagee on up to two-thirds of new residential loans in the country.  See Phillips, supra, at 264.  
 123. This is so, even in Louisiana, a state often more heavily influenced by the ideas and concepts 
behind French civil law than those behind English common law.  See, e.g., Anders Walker, The New 
Common Law: Courts, Culture, and the Localization of the Model Penal Code, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1633, 
1638 (2011). 
 124. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 20-23. 
 125. See id. at 21 (discussing Johnson v. Whiton, 34 N.E. 542 (Mass. 1893)). 
 126. 34 N.E. 542. 
 127. See Johnson, 34 N.E. at 542. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See id. 
 130. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 20-21 (footnotes omitted) (“The facts are simple.  The 
opinion . . . was authored by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., one of America’s most celebrated jurists and 
an authority on the history of the common law.  The opinion’s reasoning . . . is tightly compressed, yet 
advanced with great self-assurance.”). 
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law.
131
  However, even they acknowledge that the case has not attracted 
much attention.
132
  It is not widely cited in either case law or by treatises, 
and, to the extent that it is referred to, it is primarily in connection with 
other issues.
133
    
In sum, the courts may not cite the principle, and historical treatises 
may not recognize its wide application, but there is significant reason to 
believe that the concept is alive and important, undergirding a large swath 
of American jurisprudence relating to the very nature of property.
134
  The 
reasons for this are both interesting and relevant to our discussion of the 
costs associated with heterogeneous vesting documents. 
B.  Analogous Costs 
So what explains the existence and long-time application of the 
numerus clausus in both our legal system and in other legal systems?  
According to Merrill and Smith, this stems not from a concern for 
  
 131. See id. 
 132. See id. at 20-23. 
 133. See id.  
 134. Id. at 21-22.  Merrill and Smith do, however, acknowledge the potential that their view of a 
monolithic numerus clausus may have some weaknesses, primarily by citing and discussing Garner, 473 
N.E.2d 223.  See id. at 11-12.  Therein, the case confronted a document purporting to grant a lease of 
property for the life of the tenant.  This would violate the numerus clausus, as there is no “lease for life” 
under our classic system of estates.  The court ambiguously countenanced the interest, though it may 
have merely been shoehorning the parties’ intent into a life tenancy interest.  See Merrill & Smith, supra 
note 16, at 11-12.  Partially, then, the extent to which adoption of “new” or “different” interests can be 
seen as undermining the concept of the numerus clausus depends on the extent to which a decision can 
be seen as actually creating a “new” or “different” interest; that is, the interest ultimately countenanced 
may, in fact, be a traditional interest with a minor variation or merely a different name.  See, e.g., supra 
note 54.  That note discusses the potential creation of a “performance deed of trust,” which would consti-
tute a new and different type of vesting instrument, precisely the sort of thing this paper is arguing 
against.  Posit, however, the extent to which a vesting instrument, in fact, affects the underlying nature of 
the interest at issue.  Is a performance deed of trust, of the type discussed above, simply a new and 
different type of document that describes a well understood type of ownership interest (a lender’s se-
cured interest) or is it, in fact, a different type of interest with different sorts of legal attributes (i.e., it can 
blossom into possession only upon failure of action, not upon failure of monetary payment, which dif-
ference is akin to the difference between a remedy for damages and a remedy for specific performance, a 
well-recognized distinction under the law)?  And, if it is indeed a new and different type of interest, then 
is there not a potential argument that any different type of vesting document creates a somewhat differ-
ent legal interest?  This may be a subtle, but substantial, hole in the concept of the numerus clausus.  
More likely, though, as foreshadowed herein, the answer is that it really all depends upon how finely one 
defines “property interest.”  If any particularity or difference is substantial enough to create a different 
“type,” then it may be that the heterogeneity discussed herein has the potential to undermine the idea that 
the numerus clausus is widely honored.  If, however, one defines “type” as a subset with the same “basic 
legal dimensions, such as duration, powers of alienation, rights of inheritance, and so forth,” then the 
numerus clausus still holds, as a difference in a vesting document likely does not strike so deeply into 
what is actually conveyed.  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 14. 
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marketability
135
 but from a concern about informational burdens and 
costs.
136
  The meaning of this supposition is examined below, followed by a 
comparison of such costs to the vesting heterogeneity costs identified 
above.
137
 
1.  Informational Burdens Under the Numerus Clausus   
Merrill and Smith argue that the numerus clausus is so deeply ingrained 
in our jurisprudence because it prevents costs.
138
  Property law focuses on 
the thing and the rights flowing from that thing, and third parties have to 
expend time and resources to learn the attributes of these rights.
139
  Unusual 
property rights increase the cost of doing this, so the numerus clausus 
effectively blocks unusual property rights in order to decrease costs.
140
   
Because it focuses on the corporeal thing itself, this theory of cost can 
be said to flow from the in rem (as opposed to the in personam) nature of 
property.
141
  This is inherent in Blackstone’s famous definition of property: 
“that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over 
the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other 
individual in the universe.”142  This view of property rights focuses upon the 
thing itself: rights are defined with respect to an actual, concrete thing that 
is possessed or “owned” (as opposed to being defined with respect to the 
actors or individuals involved).
143
  This means that property effectively 
  
 135. See id. at 24-25.  Therein, Merrill and Smith acknowledge that American cases that implicitly 
follow the numerus clausus do so out of a concern about restraints on alienation.  Such restraints would 
arise from an excessive fragmentation of property rights that would create an open-ended population of 
potential claimants and, hence, large cost barriers to exchanges of property.  See id.  They ultimately 
reject this justification, though, noting that our current system of estates nicely accommodates a desire to 
create confusing future interests with large classes of potential claimants.  See id.  But see Michael A. 
Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1176-78 (1999) (disagreeing with 
Merrill and Smith by suggesting that the purpose of the numerus clausus is to promote the easy transfer-
ability of property). 
 136. See Merrill & Smtih, supra note 16, at 24-42. 
 137. See infra Part III.B.1 & III.B.2. 
 138. See generally Pomeroy, supra note 24, at 174-76. 
 139. See, e.g., infra note 151 and accompanying text.  
 140. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 8.  The numerus clausus, then, effectively presents a 
closed set of options to lawyers and others seeking to create property rights, and “[t]he chances of per-
suading a court to create a new type of property in any particular case are too remote to be taken serious-
ly.”  See id. at 24. 
 141. In rem “[i]nvolv[es] or determin[es] the status of a thing, and therefore the rights of a persons 
generally with respect to that thing[,]” as opposed to in personam, which “[i]nvolv[es] or determin[es] 
the personal rights and obligations of the parties.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 806, 809 (8th ed. 2004).  
 142. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (2d ed. 1992).       
 143. This is a traditional view of property, also relied on by Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham.  It 
is in contrast to a more recent view of property rights as a malleable “bundle of rights.”  Compare ADAM 
SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 9-86 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., 1978), and JEREMY BENTHAM, THE 
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broadcasts the rights and obligations inherent therein “to the world.”144  
This, in turn, creates a duty in “everyone else” to understand what is being 
broadcast. 
In order to avoid violating another’s property rights, [individuals] 
must ascertain what those rights are.  In order to acquire property 
rights, [individuals] must measure various attributes, ranging from 
the physical boundaries of a parcel, to use rights, to the attendant 
liabilities of the owner to others (such as adjacent owners).
145
   
Based on this, and drawing from Keppell v. Bailey
146
 (the case that gave 
us the term “fancy” to describe a prohibited new property form), Merrill and 
Smith make the point that what the numerus clausus is really doing is 
making it easier on others to understand what is being broadcast about the 
ownership rights of others in a particular thing: 
There can be no harm to allowing the fullest latitude to men in 
binding themselves and their representatives, that is, their assets real 
and personal, to answer in damages for breach of their obligations.  
This tends to no mischief, and is a reasonable liberty to bestow; but 
great detriment would arise and much confusion of rights if parties 
were allowed to invent new modes of holding and enjoying real 
property, and to impress upon their lands and tenements a peculiar 
character, which should follow them into all hands, however 
remote.  Every close, every message, might thus be held in several 
fashion; and it would hardly be possible to know what rights the 
acquisition of any parcel conferred, or what obligations it 
imposed.
147
 
That is, the courts are concerned that new property interests will create 
information costs for those third parties that are required by our in rem 
system to perceive the rights being broadcast from all property.
148
 
This is a significant concern for a number of reasons.  The first reason is 
inherent in communication.  One must expend resources (i.e., incur cost) in 
order to receive and correctly interpret communication, and expanding the 
type or range of information being communicated (i.e., changing what rights 
  
LIMITS OF JURISPRUDENCE DEFINED 164 (1945), with Felix S. Cohen, The Pragmatic Meaning of Pri-
vate Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 370 (1954). 
 144. Merrill & Smith, supra note 104, at 359. 
 145. Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 26. 
 146. Keppell, 39 Eng. Rep. at 1049.  
 147. Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, 25-26 (quoting Keppell, 39 Eng. Rep. at 1049). 
 148. See id. at 26. 
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are possible or potentially present by creating new types of property) will 
necessarily increase that cost.   
The second is the universality described above: the duty to understand 
is not personal.
149
  It does not focus on one party or even on one class of 
parties.  Instead, it attaches to “everyone else” and is necessary in order to 
permit people to clearly and efficiently perceive property rights and 
obligations and to economically arrange their plans accordingly.
150
  
Unfortunately, this universality, while helpful and necessary, greatly 
amplifies the costs of communication because those costs end up being 
applied both to interested parties and to third parties who presumably have 
no need to understand the rights and responsibilities of a given property 
owner or relating to a given piece of real property.
151
   
Property owners and those directly interested in a given piece of 
property will not take adequate account of these third party costs, so the 
informational burden identified herein is only possible so long as property 
remains simple and standardized such that “everyone else” can understand 
the broadcast easily and with little cost.
152
  By honoring the numerus 
  
 149. See id. 
 150. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 104, at 359. 
 151. See id.  Merrill and Smith posit a helpful example, which seems to have been based, at least 
in part, on a more complex hypothetical set forth by Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman.  See 
Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 27 (citing Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Unity of Property 
Rights 5, 5-6 (November 17, 1999) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with The Yale Law Journal)).  
Suppose that many people own watches.  One of these people is A, who is the sole owner of one of the 
watches and who wants to transfer some of his rights to use the watch to B.  The law, as we discussed 
above, permits the creation of various types of estate in property: A could sell a fee, a life estate, or some 
sort of concurrent interest.  But, instead of this, assume that A wants to create a time-share type of inter-
est in the watch, which would allow B to use the watch only on the fifteenth of each month.  If this sort 
of “fancy” property right were permitted, then everyone else interested in buying a watch (whether from 
A or from any other owner) would have to continually be on the lookout as to whether or not the watch 
they were interested in had been carved up in this manner or in some other unique manner.  Neither A 
nor B would care about this, as they would have accomplished their purpose and would presumably have 
accounted for any marginal cost associated with a future sale.  By foreclosing anything other than a 
standardized set of forms, then, property law forces parties to effectively moderate the costs ultimately 
born by “everyone else.” 
 152. This point about third parties is central to Merrill and Smith’s view of the numerus clausus.  
They focus on the informational asymmetry that arises due to the fact that third parties have no connec-
tion with, or exposure to, the transaction wherein the unique property interest is created.  See id. at 28.  
Those connected with the transaction (i.e., those who fall within the “zone of privity”) are able to ac-
count for the increased informational costs by incorporating them (or an expectation of them) into the 
price they receive or pay, and such immediate parties (or those within the “zone of privity” of the deci-
sion to create the fancy) could perhaps be just as effectively (and more easily) controlled or affected by a 
contractarian approach with default rules that can be opted out of.  See id. at 28-29, 31.   Those not so 
connected to the transaction, however, do not have the knowledge or ability necessary to act in an in-
formed manner and so do not have that ability.  See id. at 30-31.  And that it is that disconnect upon 
which Merrill and Smith focusthat fundamental asymmetry of information drives the numerus clausus 
as a mandatory rule of prohibition.  See id.  Interestingly, that may well be (particularly given the 
amount of interest generated by Merrill and Smith’s writings on this matter), but that is not directly 
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clausus, then, the law effectively guards against the extraordinary 
informational costs that would result from recognizing the unendingly 
unique property rights that parties would develop of their own accord: 
Limiting the number of basic property forms allows a market 
participant or a potential violator to limit . . . inquiry to whether the 
interest does or does not have the features of the forms on the menu.  
Fancies not on the closed list need not be considered because they 
will not be enforced.
153
  
This standardization lowers the cost of determining the nature of the 
property rights at issue and so economically benefits society as a whole.
154
   
2.  Informational Burdens Compared to the Cost of  
Heterogeneity 
The costs associated with the informational burdens of property, 
analyzed by Merrill and Smith and described above, are notably similar to 
  
relevant to the point made by this Article.  The relevant point here is that, at least in the view of some, 
the numerus clausus exists in order to counteract informational burdens created by new or unique prop-
erty types, and such a cost is very similar to the heterogeneity cost identified herein.  The extent to which 
those costs are borne by those outside the zone of privity is partially analogous, but it is not necessary 
and does not directly drive the application of the numerus clausus to the heterogeneity of vesting docu-
ments.  See infra Part III.B.2.  In fact, taking it even a step further, the numerus clausus is arguably 
applicable here regardless of whether or not it directly turns on informational burdens.  See, e.g., Heller, 
supra note 135, at 1176-78.  Therein, as was briefly discussed above, Heller argues that the purpose of 
the numerus clausus is to limit fragmentation of ownership and thus promote the easy transferability of 
property rights.  Id.  This is not an informational burden and so is not as similar to the heterogeneity cost 
identified above as is Merrill and Smith’s cost.  The numerus clausus would still apply, however, as it 
still posits that property law should limit newness or uniqueness when doing so would further an under-
lying goal of property law, and this is the same application urged herein, as applied to vesting document 
heterogeneity.  
 153. Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 33.  “Perhaps the key point about the numerus clausus is 
informational: The forced standardization of property forms creates a kind of shorthand which, in turn, 
reduces information costs.”  Jonathan C. Lipson, Secrets and Liens: The End of Notice in Commercial 
Finance Law, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 421, 497 (2005).  In other words, different people with differ-
ent rights to a single asset “need some means of assuring that they share a common understanding of 
those rights.”  Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Nu-
merus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 382 (2002).  Without that, 
there is potential for the parties to “mistakenly make inconsistent uses of the asset or underuse the asset” 
or to misallocate resources due to a fear that “the other will . . . opportunistically assert rights that 
properly belong to the other.”  Id.  A failure to reach such a common understanding will result in the 
parties taking costly actions to protect their rights, and in a general discouragement in improving and 
using assets.  See id. at 382-83. 
 154. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 33.  This may lead to the conclusion that there is a 
preferred balance as to the economically appropriate number of recognizable property forms.  See id. at 
39.  Some costs would be lowest in a fixed system that only recognizes a single type of property interest.  
See id. at 40.  “On the other hand, by grandfathering in existing forms of property, and permitting legis-
lative creation of new forms, the numerus clausus permits some positive level of diversification in the 
recognized forms of property.”  Id. 
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the heterogeneity costs described in Part II.B., above.
155
  As such, the 
lessons that can be drawn from the numerus clausus are relevant to vesting 
heterogeneity.   
As set forth above, the costs identified by Merrill and Smith arise from 
the in rem nature of property because people must receive and understand 
the rights and obligations that inhere in property and are thereby broadcast 
to the world at large.
156
  These costs are a central (perhaps the central
157
) 
part of the numerus clausus theory currently in circulation.  That is, Merrill 
and Smith’s positive economic analysis of the numerus clausus158 rests upon 
the conclusion that the informational burdens of new property types (or 
“fanc[ies]”) is what drives our system’s tacit adoption of the numerus 
clausus.
159
   
And those informational burden costs are strikingly similar to the 
heterogeneity costs outlined above.
160
  Those heterogeneity costs are 
measured by the extent to which vesting document variability increases the 
cost of (or otherwise detracts from) the underlying purpose of the recording 
system, which is to make information available to the right parties at the 
right time.
161
  In a very direct way, this is the same concern as that identified 
by Merrill and Smith: a concern with the difficulty and expense others will 
encounter in attempting to understand the ownership rights of a particular 
piece of property (and the rights and obligations emanating therefrom).
162
  
A comparison of examples may serve to demonstrate.  First, recall the 
example set forth above regarding unique property interests in a watch.
163
  
As Merrill and Smith point out, if A were permitted to create a new and 
fanciful type of timeshare interest in his watch, then everyone else 
interested in buying a watch (from A or from any other owner) would incur 
  
 155. See id. at 24-42; see supra Part II.B. 
 156. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 24-42. 
 157. See supra note 152.  It is clear that Merrill and Smith view their identification of cost as 
unique from predecessors examining the numerus clausus and, as such, an important part of their contri-
bution. 
 158. See, e.g., supra note 89. 
 159. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 33. 
 
Standardization reduces the costs of measuring the attributes of such rights.  Limiting the 
number of basic property forms allows a market participant or a potential violator to limit his 
or her inquiry to whether the interest does or does not have the features of the forms on the 
menu.  Fancies not on the closed list need not be considered because they will not be 
enforced. 
 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 160. See supra Part II.B. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 24-42. 
 163. See supra note 151. 
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greater cost because they would have to continually be on the lookout for 
that fancy (or for some other, unknown type of fancy).
164
  This would be 
exacerbated because neither A nor B (the party desiring to acquire the 
fanciful interest) would care much about the informational burdens incurred 
third parties (i.e., the increased cost to the system as a whole).   
Now, liken this to a scenario relating to vesting documents.  Assume 
that A owns Blackacre, which is located in a jurisdiction that permits, and 
heavily favors, deeds of trust.  A needs to borrow funds and approaches B 
for a loan.  B desires to lend money to A and to secure the loan with a 
security interest in Blackacre.  Rather than utilizing a deed of trust typical 
for the jurisdiction, however, B desires to utilize a document called “Claim 
of Lienhold Interest.”  The document functions like, and effectively is the 
same as, a deed of trust: A conveys title to a third party to hold in trust to 
secure payment of the loan to B.
165
  However, none of the parties are 
assigned traditional titles in the document itself (i.e., A is not called 
“trustor,” the third party holding title is not called “trustee,” and B is not 
called “beneficiary”), the document is not fashioned similarly to a deed of 
trust, the purpose of it is apparent only from a very deep and careful 
reading, and it contains a lot of information about B’s company of an 
advertising nature.  Such a document will create costs for others in the same 
manner as does A’s unique timeshare interest in his watch.   
For instance, assume that A later puts Blackacre up for sale and that D 
becomes interested.  Part of D’s due diligence will certainly include a title 
review, and heterogeneity will make it harder for D to find the document.  It 
will do so because the Claim of Lienhold Interest is unique and unlike other 
documents (which are themselves unlike other documents), so no 
information from the document can be loaded into a relational database that 
is efficient or searchable.
166
  Accordingly, D will have to engage in the 
traditional, and laborious, method of searching for claims on title.
167
  Also, 
once the document is found, it will be more costly to analyze and 
understand.
168
   
Moreover, as with the informational burden costs analyzed by Merrill 
and Smith, these costs will be exacerbated in that they will be imposed not 
just on D, but on “everyone else.”  Everyone interested in buying real 
  
 164. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 26-33. 
 165. See DUKEMINIER, supra note 3, at 619-20 (setting forth the basic functioning of a deed of 
trust). 
 166. See supra Part II.B. 
 167. See supra note 67. 
 168. That is clear from this hypothetical, which involves a fairly complicated document, but recall 
from above that this would hold for a simple document existing in a heterogeneous universe, as well.  
See supra note 100. 
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property in a jurisdiction permitting heterogeneous vesting documents 
(whether from A or from any other owner) will have to continually be wary 
as to what documents are recorded against property and what those 
documents mean.  Of course, neither A nor B will care about this, as A will 
have received her loan, and B will have documented its security interest in 
the fashion it desires.   
We can perceive from these examples, then, that the costs that drive the 
courts to enforce the numerus clausus in the context of the kinds of property 
interests permitted are fundamentally similar to the costs that are caused by 
vesting document heterogeneity.  Both forms of cost arise from the rights 
and obligations inherent in property that must be perceived by others and 
can be measured by the extent to which other, potentially interested parties 
must expend time and energy in accessing and understanding that 
information.  This parallel is important because it underscores the similarity 
of Merrill and Smith’s numerus clausus and so supports its application here.   
In other words, the numerus clausus, and the lessons that can be drawn 
from it, should be applied to vesting heterogeneity in order to drive the law 
in a direction that optimizes efficiency vis à vis other potentially interested 
parties.  The numerus clausus, as applied to property forms, forecloses 
anything other than a standardized set of property types in order to moderate 
the costs ultimately born by “everyone else,” and it should do the same 
thing here.  It should similarly foreclose heterogeneous documents and drive 
filers utilizing the recording system toward a standardized set of documents.  
How that would occurthat is, how the numerus clausus would function 
hereis addressed in Part IV, below.     
IV.  A “VESTING NUMERUS CLAUSUS” 
The numerus clausus analysis developed by Merrill and Smith is meant 
to explain property law’s default hostility to all but the most traditional 
types of property.  Our examination of vesting heterogeneity is similar to 
their examination of new property types, so an interesting point of 
consideration is how that analysis would work here.  Such an analysis has 
two elements.  The first is to assess what effect the analysis would have if it 
were applied.  The second is to explore how the numerus clausus could 
come into effect, given the courts’ and state legislatures’ apparent apathy 
toward vesting heterogeneity. 
A.  A Proposed Numerus Clausus Analysis  
If the numerus clausus were applied to vesting heterogeneity, it is 
reasonable to assume both that the number of categories of potential vesting 
documents would be reduced and that the content of the categories 
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remaining would be simplified.
169
  With respect to a reduction in the 
number of categories of potential vesting documents, there are countless 
documents that can be filed in the recording system: deeds, secured interest 
documents, easements, licenses, covenants, lis pendens, trust documents, 
death certificates, mechanics’ liens, judgments, releases, waiversthe list 
goes on and on and is bounded only by imagination.
170
  Moreover, each of 
these documents is merely a broad category, which may itself be constituted 
of many different sub-types.
171
  Under a numerus clausus analysis, some of 
these types of documents would simply go away.
172
  
From our current standpoint of very high variability, it is impossible to 
state with any confidence which particular categories or documents would 
go away.  It may be helpful, however, to examine one such category that 
theoretically would never have been adopted if the numerus clausus had 
been in effect with respect to vesting documents in the past.  As such, let us 
take a look at what is known as the grant, bargain, and sale deed (a “GBS 
deed”), as it is utilized in a given jurisdiction (here, Nevada).173     
  
 169. That the remaining categories would be simplified is highly likely.  Standardization and 
simplification are closely related, as the process of standardizing any sort of input or process generally 
involves a reduction of the given input or process to its most integral components (i.e., its most simple, 
functional state).  See, e.g., S. ANIL KUMAR & N. SURESH, OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT 198 (2009).  
Recall, however, that simplification of the documents is not necessary or integral to cost-cutting, as any 
standardization will lower the costs involved in reviewing ownership information.  See supra note 100. 
 170. Legal Dictionary, LAW.COM, http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=1751 (last 
visited July 25,2012) (defining “Record” and stating, “[n]ormally recorded is any document affecting 
title to real property such as a deed, deed of trust, mortgage, reconveyance, release, declaration of home-
stead, easement, judgment, lien, request for notice of default, foreclosure, satisfaction of judgment, 
decree of distribution of a dead person’s estates and sometimes long-term leases.”).  See, e.g., MASS. 
GEN. LAW sch. 156C, § 66 (West 2012), available at http://www.malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/ 
PartI/TitleXXII/Chapter156c/Section66 (listing as recordable instruments “any deed, lease, notice of 
lease, mortgage, discharge or release of mortgage, assignment of mortgage, easement and certificate of 
fact.”). 
 171. For example, one of the categories is deed, but there are numerous types of deeds.  There are 
general warranty deeds, special warranty deeds, and quitclaim deeds, to name a few.  See, e.g., 
DUKEMINIER, supra note 3, at 585-86.  Similarly, another category is secured interest documents, which 
consists of mortgages and deeds of trust. See Treas. Reg. Rule, 26 C.F.R. § 1.860G–2(a)(5) (2011) 
(noting “[o]bligations secured by interests in real property include the following: mortgages, deeds of 
trust . . . .”). 
 172. Of course, this depends on when the numerus clausus is applied.  This Article attempts to 
apply the numerus clausus concept to vesting heterogeneity in an original fashion, starting at a theoreti-
cal point of time in the past.  That is, it does not attempt to analyze the costs inherent in changing the 
existing suite of vesting documents available in a given jurisdiction.  Instead, it examines how the nu-
merus clausus would apply to a given vesting document if it were so applied immediately before that 
vesting document were adopted or not.  To apply the numerus clausus doctrine on a retroactive ba-
sisthat is, to ask to what extent it could be utilized to actually roll back the documents now availa-
blewould require an analysis different from the one set forth in this section in that such an analysis 
would have to account for the additional costs associated with upsetting existing practice and expecta-
tions. 
 173. Nevada is not special and merely serves as an example. 
2012] STANDARDIZED VESTING DOCUMENTS 989 
In Nevada, a GBS deed differs from a warranty deed in that it does not 
come with all of the implied warranties inherent in warranty deeds.
174
  
Instead, a GBS deed only creates two covenants: (a) a covenant that, prior to 
the time of the conveyance, the grantor has not conveyed the same real 
property, or any right, title, or interest therein, to any person other than the 
grantee; and (b) a covenant that the real property is, at the time of the 
execution of the conveyance, free from encumbrances done, made or 
suffered by the grantor, or any person claiming under him.
175
  This is 
substantially more limited than the warranty deed covenants.
176
  
Additionally, these GBS deed covenants do not run with the land; unlike 
warranty deed covenants, which benefit later grantees, these covenants 
benefit the immediate grantee only.
177
   
The GBS deed, then, is in the same category as the special warranty or 
general warranty deed, but it creates different legal obligations and rights.  
So what kind of effect would the numerus clausus doctrine have here?  
Recall that, at its most basic, the doctrine would eliminate “fan[cies].”178  
But it would not do so indiscriminately.  We can see this from the existing 
numerus clausus and its effect on permissible property types. 
  
 174. Warranty deeds carry with them six covenants, or warranties: the covenant of seisen, the 
covenant of further assurances, the covenant against encumbrances, the covenant of general warranty, 
the covenant of quiet enjoyment, and the covenant of right to convey.  See DUKEMINIER, supra note 3, at 
585-90.  These differ somewhat, depending on which type of warranty deed is given.  Id.  The general 
warranty deed warrants against all defects in title, whenever occurring, and the special warranty deed 
warrants only against the grantor’s own acts.  Id.   
 175. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1113 (West 2011); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 111.170 (West 2011).  In 
other words, the grantor is promising that she did not convey the property to anyone else and that she has 
not “done, made or suffered” any encumbrances on it.  “Suffered” in this context means “caused to be 
placed,” and any encumbrance within the grantor’s “power to prevent” falls within this category.  See 
GEORGE LEFCOE, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 94.07(b)(2)(i) (David A. Thomas ed., 2009); Crist 
v. Fife, 183 P. 197 (Cal. App. 1919).   
 176. Though the implied covenants set forth in supra note 174, above, are somewhat archaic in 
nature, and so are somewhat subject to interpretation, it seems patent that these two covenants would not 
provide any of the benefits of the covenant of further assurances, the covenant of quiet enjoyment, and, 
most notably, the covenant of seisen.  That is, the grantor is not promising good title or even claiming 
that she owns the property.   
 177. See LEFCOE, supra note 175, § 94.07(b)(2)(i).  Despite this odd mixture of warranty deed 
covenants and limited duration, the author’s experience indicates that the GBS deed is favored over the 
special warranty deed in Nevada.  That means that, if you are doing business in Nevada, you cannot 
simply rely on local custom and assume that what you are getting is analogous to what you are accus-
tomed to getting.  Recall the Introduction, above.  See supra Part I.  In many ways, this is precisely what 
this Article is addressing: the costs you must incur every time you deal with real estate due to the fact 
that so many different categories and sub-types of vesting documents are permitted. 
 178. In its traditional form, as it has been applied for centuries, it is more accurate to say that it has 
prevented the creation of fancies.  In reality, we are examining a different situation, wherein the numerus 
clausus has not been applied historically to vesting heterogeneity.  We must imagine, then, how the 
numerus clausus would be applied to a given type of vesting document immediately prior to that docu-
ment’s historical adoption.  See supra note 172. 
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As Merrill and Smith have indicated, the best way to reduce costs 
incurred by third parties would be to mandate a single option.
179
  In the case 
of property forms, it would probably be “a simple usufruct or an undivided 
fee simple.”180  In the case of vesting documents, it would probably be some 
sort of “notice of interest” that simply indicated that the filer claimed a right 
in the property.
181
  The problem with this, of course, is that it creates its own 
costs in that it would frustrate parties’ goals and their ability to reach 
legitimate goals.
182
  That is obviously not desirous, and the standardization 
enforced by way of the currently operable numerus clausus does not really 
do that.  Though its limitation on cognizable property types may at times 
frustrate parties, most objectives can be attained by simply combining the 
relatively limited number of property types that are available.
183
   
What we are left with, then, is a doctrine that seeks not maximum 
standardization, but a balanced level of standardizationone that minimizes 
the sorts of costs examined above, but that does not completely eliminate 
creativity and ingenuity.  In other words, what we are left with is “optimal 
standardization.”184  Merrill and Smith represent this in a model of the 
  
 179. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 34. 
 180. Id. at 35. 
 181. Or perhaps, in either case, there would be an extremely limited menu consisting of no sub-
types. 
 182. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 35. 
 183. See id. (citing Whiton, 473 N.E.2d at 542).  Merrill and Smith use the example of a property 
owner who desires to enter into a lease “for the duration of the war.”  See id.  As discussed above, this 
type of property interest would likely fail under the numerus clausus.  See supra note 110.  However, 
this type of lease could effectively be created by drafting a long-term lease determinable upon the termi-
nation of the war.  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 35.  This avoidability does not mean that 
numerus clausus is either superficial or trivial.  Id.  As to the former, some have focused on the avoida-
bility of the numerus clausus to argue that the doctrine is an example of “form over substance.”  See 1 
POWELL, supra note 110, § 11.01, at 16-68.  However, as Merrill and Smith point out, “this is true only 
if the measurement costs to third parties of ascertaining the meaning [of a work-around solution] are the 
same as the costs of ascertaining the meaning of [an entirely new interest.]”  See Merrill & Smith, supra 
note 16, at 12 n.29.  As to the latter, the ability to work around the numerus clausus creates a cost for 
those seeking to do so.  See id. at 35.  They must invest the resources to create a path to their objective, 
and that required investment acts as a kind of “pollution tax,” which will disincentivize such activity and 
so suppress new and fanciful creations.  See id.  Ultimately, then, the system drives participants toward 
standardized components but effectively permits great creativity and ingenuity.  Merrill and Smith liken 
this to languagein both, there are standardized building blocks that cannot generally be discarded but 
that can be utilized in a recursive fashion to create a literally infinite number of possibilities and that can 
permit significantly more complex structures to be fashioned therefrom.  See id. at 35-36. 
 184. Hence the title of Merrill and Smith’s work upon which this author has so consistently, and 
gratefully, drawn.  The concept arises when one views standardization as a spectrum.  See id. at 38.  On 
one end is total and mandatory standardization, with the frustration costs discussed above, and on the 
other end is total freedom of customization, with the informational costs discussed above.  See Merrill & 
Smith, supra note 16, at 38.  Optimal standardization lies somewhere in the middle of this spectrum.  See 
id. 
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choice of the number of property forms, from which the following is 
derived:
185
 
 
        Cost   
                      Frustration Cost          
                                                 Information Burden Cost 
                                           *  
 
0            Q 
         Property Forms 
 
The x-axis is the number of property forms permissible.  It starts at 0 and 
ranges up to Q, which represents the number of property forms that would 
exist in a system with no standardization constraints.  It assumes that the 
most simple and widely utilized property forms (i.e., the fee simple and the 
like) will be adopted first (closer to 0).  The y-axis is the generic cost 
incurred by society; the lower on this y-axis, the better, as lower cost means 
higher social wealth and well-being.  As is shown on the model, this permits 
the representation of two separate cost curves.  One, the “information cost 
curve,” measures the costs caused by the different permissible property 
forms.  It starts near 0 on the x-axis.  As the number of forms increases 
beyond the simplest property forms, this curve increases at an accelerating 
pace.  That is, the marginal information costs increase as more specialized, 
more complicated, and more confusing property forms emerge.
186
  The 
other, the “frustration cost curve,” measures the frustration cost caused by 
the different permissible property forms.  It starts high on the y-axis and 
moves toward 0 at an accelerating pace as the permissible number of forms 
increases.  That is, the marginal frustration costs increase as fewer and 
  
 185. See id.  The model set forth herein differs from that of Merrill and Smith, but this discussion 
is drawn from their model and analysis of the same. 
 186. It is a curve because the marginal costs of information increase as property forms become 
more exotic and hence more and more difficult to access and understand.  
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fewer property forms are allowed such that parties are less and less able to 
freely structure their relationships and arrangements.
187
 
Merrill and Smith contend that the numerus clausus, by creating a 
presumption against new forms of property types, balances the need to 
brake parties’ creativity with a recognition of long-settled property rights 
and legislative creativity.
188
   Though they do not contend that the numerus 
clausus has created a current ideal number of property forms (or even that 
there is a truly singular optimal), they do believe that the numerus clausus 
pushes the system toward the hypothetical point * (from the model above), 
which is where overall costs are minimized.
189
   
The same would happen in if the heterogeneous GBS deed were judged 
pursuant to a “vesting heterogeneity numerus clausus.”  There, the operative 
agent of judgment
190
 would engage in an optimization analysis.  The 
analysis would involve determining, in some fashion, whether the GBS 
deed decreases frustration costs by an amount that is greater than its 
concomitant increase in informational burden costs.   
A model of the type discussed above would again be relevant.  Indeed, 
in a world wherein the numerus clausus were applied to vesting 
heterogeneity, we could modify the model as follows: 
 
 
           Cost 
     
                   Frustration Cost 
  
                                                Cost of Heterogeneity  
      
                                            * 
 
       
     0                                                  Q 
                                    Vesting Documents  
  
 187. It is a curve because the marginal costs of frustration decrease as property forms become 
more varied in that, beyond a certain point, each additional property form permits relatively less and less 
creativity. 
 188. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 40. 
 189. See id. 
 190. See infra Part IV.B. 
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The x-axis, this time, is the number of categories and sub-types of vesting 
documents permissible.  It starts at 0 and ranges to Q, which represents the 
number of categories and sub-types of vesting documents that would exist 
in a system with no standardization.  It assumes that the most simple and 
widely utilized property forms (i.e., a general warranty deed) will be 
adopted first (closer to 0).  As above, the y-axis is the generic cost incurred 
by society.  Again, these two axes permit the representation of two cost 
curves.  The frustration curve is the same as above.  The cost of 
heterogeneity curve is similar to that discussed above, but instead of 
tracking information burden cost, it tracks the costs of heterogeneity 
discussed herein.
191
   
Our vesting heterogeneity numerus clausus, then, would seek to 
determine whether a world with the GBS deed is at, or to the left of, point *.  
If it is, then it makes sense to permit it.  The frustration costs associated 
with losing the unique characteristics and attributes of the GBS deed
192
 
exceed the heterogeneity costs created by the addition of yet another type of 
vesting document, so the world would be better off with this type of 
document.  If it is to the right of this point, however, it does not make sense 
to permit this type of document.  The frustration costs associated with losing 
the unique characteristics and attributes of the GBS deed are less than the 
heterogeneity costs created by the addition of the GBS deed to our 
recordable oeuvre, and the world would be better off without the new 
document.
193
 
Though it is mere speculation to surmise how the GBS deed would have 
been judged under such an analysis, it may be possible to more accurately 
examine how another vesting document would have been judged, given that 
its evolution and adoption are relatively recent and well understood.  That 
document is the trust deed.   
Historically, creditors with security interests in real estate utilized (i.e., 
recorded) mortgages.
194
  These became problematic, however, as courts of 
equity instituted the “equity of redemption,” which permitted borrowers to 
take back possession of a foreclosed property even after the foreclosure 
  
 191. As above, both of these are curves because the costs at issue marginally increase or decrease 
in synch with the x-axis. 
 192. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 193. Recall that this does not mean that parties are simply out of luck if they really need to, or 
desire to, impart the ownership attributes associated with a GBS deed. In such a situation, the parties 
could simply convey by some other deed and specify within the language of the deed itself that only 
certain covenants are made or implied.  This would permit the parties to achieve their objective but still 
serve the purpose of the numerus clausus by disincentivizing fanciful documents.  See supra note 184. 
 194. See DUKEMINIER, supra note 3, at 616-21. 
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sale.
195
  For obvious reasons, this right was problematic for creditors, and 
they immediately sought a way to avoid it.
196
  They soon found it, when the 
courts of law intervened and blocked the equity of redemption after a 
judicially supervised foreclosure sale.
197
  Such a sale, however, required a 
lawsuit and attorneys and all of the additional expense and effort associated 
with legal remedies.  As such, attorneys settled upon a substitute document, 
the trust deed, as a way to minimize cost but still avoid the equity of 
redemption.
198
  It did so by permitting a sale (the key element necessary to 
avoid the equity of redemption) without the involvement of the courts.
199
  In 
other words, the deed of trust proved to be uniquely useful and suitable to 
the task at hand.  
This development seems to fit neatly into the optimization analysis 
associated with the numerus clausus and embodied in the models set forth 
above.  Because this document arose in direct response to a limitation (or 
perceived limitation) inherent in the existing suite of documents, we can see 
why it was created and how it gained such widespread application.  As such, 
it seems relatively plausible to balance that interest (or, in other words, the 
cost that exists absent the document) against the cost of introducing an 
additional vesting document into the system.  And, doing so, it seems likely 
that a vesting heterogeneity numerus clausus would have permitted such a 
document, as the frustration costs (not being able to avoid a costly and 
difficult foreclosure process) credibly seem to exceed the heterogeneity 
costs (the difficulty incurred by everyone else due to the addition of an 
additional secured lending vesting document).  In other words, the trust 
deed does not push the system to the right of point *. 
This, then, is how a vesting heterogeneity numerus clausus could take 
effect.
200
  In much the same way that the numerus clausus has put a brake 
upon individual creativity in the name of wider efficiency, and so strongly 
reduced the number of potential property forms, it could do the same here.  
It could counteract the historical trend of the recording system, which has 
been so open to unbridled creativity, and limit new vesting documents when 
the heterogeneity costs incurred exceed the frustration costs of the 
prohibition.  How, though, could this type of analysis come to bear?  In the 
context of property forms, the agent of implementation has been the court 
  
 195. See id. 
 196. See id. 
 197. See id. 
 198. See id. 
 199. It accomplished this by having the owner/borrower place the property into trust for the bene-
fit of the lender and with directions to the trustee to sale the property if the owner/borrower defaulted on 
her obligations.  See DUKEMINIER, supra note 3, at 619-20. 
 200. Again, if it were applied prospectively.  See supra note 172. 
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system.
201
  The courts have shown no parallel inclination here,
202
 though, so 
any potential numerus clausus analysis would have to come from another 
source. 
B.  How to Institute the Numerus Clausus Here  
Initially, it seems reasonable to believe that the institution of a numerus 
clausus type of doctrine should come from the legislature.  With the courts 
having failed to insinuate themselves into this property law issue (perhaps 
due to a deference to the legislative nature of the recording system),
203
 it 
seems as though legislatures could lay down rules or prohibitions regarding 
what categories or sub-types of vesting documents are permissible.  This 
would seem particularly apt given that legislatures seem more capable of 
making the highly qualitative types of judgments that suppression (or not) 
of private creativity involves.
204
  But they too have failed to speak to this 
issue, perhaps believing the record systems function “well enough,” given 
their historicity.
205
  Whatever the cause of this abdication of responsibility, 
it means that some other source will have to provide the impetus or 
grounding behind any potential numerus clausus effect on vesting 
documents. 
One possibility is the free market.  A market-based source of vesting 
documents could conceivably become significant enough that it could create 
and foster a system of “network effects” so influential as to drive parties 
  
 201. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 9-10 (discussing the numerus clausus as a “norm of 
judicial self-governance.”). 
 202. Why the courts have shown so little inclination to limit the types of vesting documents is not 
entirely clear, though it seems reasonable to believe that this reluctance may be tied to the fact that the 
entire recording system is a legislative construct.  See supra Part II.A.  If the courts are willing to permit 
legislatures to avoid the numerus clausus in the property form context (or unable to stop legislatures 
from doing as much), then it seems likely that they would be similarly unwilling to reduce the range of 
potential document choices when those choices seem to arise from, and be approved by, a legislative 
system. 
 203. See id. 
 204. See, e.g., Emily Hammond Meazell, Scientific Avoidance: Toward More Principled Judicial 
Review of Legislative Science, 84 IND. L. J. 239, 262 (2009) (“[L]egislatures are better situated, at least 
in the abstract, to consider issues of a non-binary, or qualitative nature.”).  We can see this sort of respect 
for the legislature’s prerogative in the manner in which various property forms have come into being.  
See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 15-16 (discussing the legislative nature of time-shares); 
DUKEMINIER, supra note 3, at 264-70 (discussing the legislative creation and evolution of executory 
interests). 
 205. But see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-480 (West 2010) (setting forth similar requirements, 
including that each document have a caption stating the nature of the document); UTAH CODE ANN. § 
57-3-101 et seq. (West 2010) (setting forth some requirements for documents to be recorded).  These 
statutes set forth minimum requirements, and that is better than a wholly unregulated system, but there is 
far too much left to discretion and more than enough potential variability to ensure that the heterogeneity 
costs discussed above are not avoided. 
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toward standardization.  Network effects exist when one party’s adoption of 
a particular format or standard has positive consequences for other adopters 
of the same.
206
   
The value of a particular form of communication or 
technologythe English language, for example, or the Macintosh 
computer operating systemincreases with the number of people 
who share that means of communication. The more people who 
learn a particular language or adopt a given operating system, the 
more useful that language or operating system becomes.  An 
increase in the number of people who learn the language creates 
more opportunities for communication, while an increase in the 
number of people who use the operating system promotes the 
production of a greater variety of compatible software at lower 
prices.  In both cases, as the size of the network increases, the utility 
of the network itself increases.   These increases in the value of 
network membership not only confer benefits upon existing users, 
but also encourage additional users to join, which in turn drives up 
the value of network membership even further.
207
  
This effect can apply to legal standards as well.
208
  When a particular 
standard of process reaches this point, it becomes self-reinforcing: the more 
people that adopt the standard or format, the more value there is to continue 
to do so.
209
 
Keeping this in mind, it seems conceivable that a market-based 
organization could promulgate a relatively compact series of vesting 
document forms and ultimately become so popular as to become a sort of de 
facto standard.  The source would have to be sensitive to market forces and 
provide parties the documents they need and desire, but could do so with an 
inclination toward qualitative and quantitative simplicity.  Such a source of 
vesting documents, if it became entrenched enough, could supply a 
significant percentage of all vesting documents recorded and so become 
known as a safe and essential place to locate documents any time one is in 
  
 206. See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism, 
99 CAL. L. REV. 1163, 1183 (2011) (citing, in relevant part, L. Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and 
Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 94 (1994)). 
 207. See id. (footnotes omitted). 
 208. See id. at 1184. 
 209. An example would be the widespread popularity of incorporating in Delawarethe more 
corporations incorporate there, the more accepted it becomes to do so, and the more comfortable people 
come to be with Delaware as a state of incorporation.  See id.  Eventually, people expect parties to incor-
porate there because it has a polished, well-developed body of corporate law and because it is just “the 
thing to do.” 
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search of a form to record.
210
  Such a singular source is plausible without 
government intervention, given the existence, and increasingly important 
nature, of the internet.
211
  Without court order, statute, or regulation, that 
organization could become the standard source of vesting documents and, 
over time, effectively impose a vesting heterogeneity numerus clausus 
wherein there is so much utility behind using and adopting the forms from 
the organization (or, put another way, so much disutility in not using and 
adopting the forms from the organization) that new vesting document 
categories and sub-types become virtually prohibited.
212
 
Admittedly, such a system would not be perfect and would not as 
strongly funnel society toward standardization as would the courts or the 
legislature.
213
  However, it would be better than nothing, which is what we 
have now, and it could, if it gained significant traction, have a systemic 
effect on the choices parties make when choosing to record.
214
   
V.  CONCLUSION 
Vesting documents are easily forgotten, as they seem a basic, 
unremarkable element of the American recording system and its focus on 
the provision of information to interested parties.  Because of this, it is 
generally taken for granted that parties are permitted to record virtually 
anything they want.  This vast heterogeneity makes sense, given the history 
  
 210. Given the current status of the system, this system would conceivably function in two ways.  
First, and most importantly, it would stop new documents from proliferating.  Second, it would cause 
unpopular and little-utilized documents in current circulation to atrophy and drop out of use when mar-
ket demand ceased to justify their use.   
 211. Such a system would also have the benefit of putting the choice, effectively, within the mar-
ket’s hands.  Rather than rely on courts or legislatures to determine what is or is not a useful addition to, 
or subtraction from, the suite of possible document types, the markets would be able to so decide.  In 
effect, the Internet would permit the voices of “the market” to speak as one on this singular topic. 
 212. Merrill and Smith touch upon network effects, but they do so to rebut it as a potential objec-
tion to the numerus clausus.  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 45-49 (setting forth the hypothetical 
objection that “mandatory standardization [is] unnecessary [because] standardization will occur sponta-
neously”).  This seems a rather odd point for them to make.  Their discussion of the numerus clausus, so 
well done, arises from a positive perspectivethat is, it is a description of why the law functions the 
way that it does.  That this might also happen outside of the courts’ reach seems no serious reason to 
question it happening within it.  The numerus clausus is, in effect, a free-standing doctrine, which either 
exists or does not, and the fact that it has been effected via the courts is not central to the functioning of 
its precepts.   
 213. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 46 (pointing out that any form of standardization that 
is not government-mandated will be, by definition, less capable of lowering the information burden costs 
outlined herein because even a relatively small rate of non-standardization will effectively pollute the 
system by sewing uncertainty). 
 214. There are various examples of technology companies, for example, that have become so close 
to standard that everyone else can generally be assumed to be familiar with them enough that potential 
users or consumers likely have a high degree of confidence that these companies’ products are readily 
perceivable and understandable.  These include Microsoft, Google, and others. 
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of recording system, which evolved in an ad hoc fashion with the relatively 
modest goal of permitting interested commercial actors who need ownership 
information to obtain that information in a reliable manner, and the 
development of different vesting documents over time.   
This does not mean, however, that heterogeneity is without cost.  In 
fact, the goal of the recording system is significantly undermined by the 
extent to which this heterogeneity makes it difficult for parties to gather 
useful information.  Borrowing from extant research in database theory, this 
Article concludes that the lack of uniformity in vesting documents ensures a 
costly and inefficient system, a fact exacerbated by the fact that these costs 
are systemically imposed upon parties other than those who benefit from the 
heterogeneity that causes the costs. 
These costs are interesting in and of themselves and also because they 
bring to bear a related doctrine, known as the numerus clausus.  This 
doctrine, well-known in legal literature, is an economics-based explanation 
for the fact that our legal system routinely rejects attempts to create new 
types of property interests and so funnels real estate dealings into a 
relatively narrow set of historically accepted property forms.  The doctrine 
is driven by a concern for the informational burdens that new property types 
create and impose on others.   
This doctrine, then, has application here.  The numerus clausus, used to 
describe the law’s requirement of uniform property forms based upon a 
desire to permit others to efficiently perceive ownership information, could 
easily apply to a hypothetical requirement of uniform vesting documents 
based upon the same desire.  If it were so applied, it would likely operate in 
the same fashion, restricting creativity generally, but permitting new 
property forms when the benefits of doing so would outweigh the costs 
inherent in acknowledging a new property form.  One way this could 
happen here is via the free market, which could utilize relatively novel 
technology and resources to create a self-policing and reinforcing network 
of vesting document forms.   
If such a thing were to occur, the system would be significantly 
improved.  No longer would parties be free to fashion unique and difficult 
to understand documents to reflect ownership rights or claims.  This would 
immeasurably improve the recording system’s ability to accomplish its 
purpose of providing information, something that is sorely called for.   
 
